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Introduction
The principal objective of economic theory and general equilibrium theory is to
study the allocation of resources achievable via a system of markets. In the classical
version it is (indirectly) presumed that the whole activity of an economy could be
viewed as taking place in a single time period, in which the physical parameters
are (more or less) stable, agents have full enough information about the economic
variables to make their own rational decisions, bargains are realized for infinitely
short periods and so on. Such types of settings are said to be complete markets, de-
scribed by the classical theory of resource allocation, which finds its most completed
form in the Arrow–Debreu theory (model). However in the world of real economy,
individuals are forced to make decisions under uncertainty conditions arising from
incomplete information and the objective uncertainty of future events. As a result,
in a modern economy one can observe not only ordinary commodity markets but also
a rich array of markets of specific financial tools, so-called assets. The functioning
of these markets is directly aimed at solving problems of this kind, problems deeply
related to the uncertainty of the future. Examples of these markets are the insurance
business, the markets of futures contracts, trade with options1 of different kinds, etc.
This problem, related with the uncertainty of the future, was well understood by
the classical economic theorists (see survey by Radner (1981)), but this subject has
received new attention in the literature of the early 80’s, when opportunities to de-
velop the classical Arrow–Debreu theory ended. The result was the development, in
an extended Arrow–Debreu model framework, of the incomplete market theory (e.g.,
see Geanakoplos (1990), Magill and Shafer (1991) for a general overview). The term
incomplete appeals to the fact that the potentially infinite set of possible realiza-
tions of the future is surely wider than those created by people, ‘insurance variants,’
expressed in the form of financial assets. Thus the incomplete market theory models
an economic environment in which economic agents live and function under the con-
straints related to the possible differences in times when goods appear on markets
and the objectively defined uncertainty of the future with respect to the present.
Moreover, from the big array of ways to model uncertainty and time, this theory
chooses those that reflect the specific financial features of real market economies,
covering simultaneously the classical theory of resource allocation. However, the
modern version of incomplete market theory has one essential gap — there is no
satisfactory concept of domination by coalitions (of allocations) and consequently
an appropriate core notion is lacking. In fact, in a classical setting, the competitive
equilibrium concept, having descriptive power, is also supported by the fact that
1This is the trade of property rights for future optional contracts, where ‘call’ is to buy and
‘put’ is to sell some commodity.
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there is no group of agents (coalition) that has incentives to form an autonomous
subeconomy (it is said that the equilibrium belongs to the core — i.e., this is not
dominated by any coalition). Moreover in the conditions of perfect competition,
every allocation from the core allows price decentralization, i.e., it is an equilibrium
relative to some prices — this is Edgeworth’s well known conjecture. So in the ideal
world of an Arrow–Debreu economy, competitive equilibrium, primary defined in a
purely descriptive way, obtains the normative foundation as an ideally stable (in a
given sense) allocation. This is why it seems quite natural to rise the question about
the core definition in an incomplete market environment and to clarify its relations
with the financial equilibrium. Moreover, the answer to this question will allow us
to better understand what kind of (coalition) stability real observed financial mar-
kets have and what are the obstacles to stabilizing them. In further perspective,
the obtained answer may allow us to clarify the role of state (regulating body) in
financial market stability, which seems to be important in practice for undeveloped
markets and states with its economy in transition, in which the economic situation
is far from equilibrium.
The main theoretical goal of this paper is to suggest and to investigate a core
concept in incomplete (financial) markets — a difficult quest for economic theory,
which still has not fond a satisfactory solution. In the author’s strong opinion, a
‘correct’ core concept has to inherit the main properties of classical markets and has
to satisfy the following two requirements:
• Let the economy be described as an incomplete market but in fact be complete,
i.e., it is mathematically equivalent to a standard pure exchange model, in which
equilibria correspond to financial equilibria. Formally, this means that the rank of
the matrix of value returns from assets is equal to the number of future events.
Then the classical concept of the core and a new concept, introduced for incomplete
markets, can be applied simultaneously. In such a case, the set of allocations for
the core of an incomplete market should coincide with the set of standard core
allocations.
• Under perfect competition conditions, the core and equilibria have to coincide —
for a standard exchange economy this is the coincidence of Edgeworth’s equilibria
(the allocations that belong to the core of each replicated economy) with competitive
equilibria.
So I take these properties as the main criterion for a correct definition for a core
and coalition domination in financial markets.
I suggest that the notion of contract be a cornerstone of the definition of domina-
tion and a core for an economic model and, of course, for incomplete markets. The
original idea of a contract is attributed to Makarov (1980), (1982). In the framework
of an ordinary pure exchange model, every contract is simply an elementary, pos-
sible and permissible exchange of commodities among consumers. Contracts may
be added to one another and with every (finite) set of contracts, an allocation of
resources can be associated — as a result of the summation of contracts and the
initial endowments allocation. It is presumed that every feasible set of (permissible)
contracts — let us call it ‘a web of contracts’ — may be changed during the economic
life. Each consumer or their coalition can break contracts in which it participates,
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and each coalition of consumers can also sign a new contract(s). In the framework of
a standard pure exchange economy this approach was developed by Kozyrev (1981),
(1982), where the author suggested to partially break contracts, and by Vasil’ev
(1984). In these papers the first positive results were obtained regarding the coinci-
dence (under some technical assumptions) of equilibrium and the so-called (in our
terminology)‘proper contractual allocations.’ 2 These are the allocations that can be
realized by a web of contracts and which are stable relative to the procedure of both
parties partially breaking existing contracts and the signing of new contracts. At
the same time, core allocations were described in the terms of ‘contractual alloca-
tions.’ These are the allocations that can be realized by a web of contracts and
which are stable relative to the procedure of both parties (fully) breaking contracts
and the signing new contracts. Thus the only difference between these two notions
of contractual allocation is that in the first case the partial breaking of contracts is
allowed, while in the second case, only complete breaking is possible. This way, an
equilibrium is described in pure game-theoretical terms and does not address any
kind of value parameters. The mathematical nature of this phenomena is the same
as in the case of the coincidence of equilibrium allocations with fuzzy core elements
(or Edgeworth’s equilibria), which is one possible way to model the conditions of
perfect competition.
In the analysis of modern economic models, the contract-based approach has,
in the author’s strong opinion, serious advantages in comparison with the classical
approach. First, this approach provides more precise and clear language, avoid-
ing the particular specifications of the studied model. This language allows easier
to express ideas, in economic as well as in mathematical terms, to be applied in
cumbersome constructions of modern economic models. In fact, the diversity of
models3 and the difficulties arising from their analysis are caused, on one hand, by
the complexity of the object (economy) and, on the other hand, by the absence of
sufficiently universal tools for model investigation. The latter resulted in a variety of
solution concepts primarily related to the notion of domination (via coalition) and
therefore to the concept of a core. The reason for this is that following the classical
tradition, primary attention is paid to the analysis of the final resource allocation.
The commonly missed fact is that in a real economy this allocation is a result of
many exchange dealings among economic agents (coalitions). It is important that
not every exchange is permissible in a real economy. There are many reasons for
this: institutional, physical, informational, ethical, behavioral, etc. I believe that
the focus of the theory should be shifted to concentrate directly on the exchange
bargains of commodities (contracts), which should be included in the model as prim-
itives and form (together with the other model elements) the basis for theoretical
constructions instead of allocations. Applying the contract-based approach, one can
more clearly describe the transition process to a stable (non-dominated) resource
allocation (from a core). This approach is nearer to the intuitive imagination of
2I changed notations and terminology. My approach to the contract based economic model as
a whole was essentially revised and generalized.
3In modern economic theory, one can see a number of non-perfect market models, not only
incomplete markets; they are the markets with informational asymmetry (about future events,
etc.), sequential markets (time factor and trust), and so on; see my list of references.
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the real processes of price and consumption formations; in particular, it provides
additional links between cooperative and individualistic views on agents’ behavior.
From the mathematical point of view the contract-based approach adds the analysis
of direct variables, the exchange bargains of commodities, to the analysis of dual
variables (prices). This, being weak investigated, allows us to produce new inter-
esting results. I hope that this approach, as a supplement to the classical one, can
help to clarify and solve many difficult problems of economic theory arising in the
analysis of non-perfect markets.
This paper develops the theory of contracts, the elements of which were founded
by Makarov (1980), (1982) and Kozyrev (1981), (1982), first in the framework of an
abstract economy4 and then applies the theory to incomplete markets. I consider
and study the formal rules of operating with the sets of contracts. The difference in
these rules corresponds to the difference in the types of a web’s stability and therefore
in the stability of allocations realized by given webs. The types of these ‘stabilities,’
together with the property of allowable contracts, reflect the different behavioral,
physical and institutional principles formally given in game-theoretical form, which
one can find in real life and in neoclassical economic theory. So the different types
of web stabilities correspond to the different types of contractual allocations, as well
as their modifications, which can relax or strengthen the property for an allocation
to be stable. This way, depending on the structure of permissible contracts, one
can describe notions well known in economic theory such as the core, competitive
equilibria, Pareto boundary and so on in the terms of a stable web of contracts.
Applying my contractual approach in the incomplete market framework, I give
the description of financial equilibria (see my definition in the third section). The
fact that not every exchange of commodities can be realized in an incomplete mar-
ket, i.e., not every contract is permissible, is very important in this context. For
example, the direct exchange of commodities between the different states of the
world is impossible (how one can imagine the exchange contract between the dif-
ferent events of the future so that only one or none of these events can be true
in reality?). However some of these exchanges can be realized via assets, which
together with the multiplicity of events characterizes in a most specific form the
incomplete market since trade or exchanges by these ‘standard contracts’ is gone in
the only common state of the world, that is in the present. Thus for incomplete
markets, it is reasonable to presume that only contracts signed relative to some
given (fixed) state of the world are permissible. Therefore, a new contract which
some coalition is going to sign has to correspond to only one state of the world —
to the present or future state. The agents can also partially or fully break contracts
in the present and can break every contract (perhaps even equivalent ones in some
sense) in each of the future states of the world. Suppose there is no such coalition,
that the members of coalition can increase utility when these procedures are applied
simultaneously. Then, using different abilities, one can yield contractual allocations
of different types, which one can conventionally call complex contractual. Using this
approach, I not only describe financial equilibria but also identify the kind of com-
plex contractual allocations, which one can take as core allocations of an incomplete
market. So one can see a similarity in the relations between the core and equilibria,
4This part of the paper was previously published by Marakulin (2002).
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being defined in terms of contracts, a similarity between standard exchange econ-
omy and incomplete market. Moreover, it is not simply similarity, but it means that
in perfect competition conditions, the core and equilibria of an incomplete market
coincides.
This paper contains two parts and is organized as follows. The first part is
an essay on the theory of exchange contracts and contains three sections. The
model and assumptions are described in the first section; the main definitions of the
contract-based approach in a general framework of contractual exchange economy
is presented in the second section; the third section is devoted to the study of
a standard pure exchange economy as one possible application of the contractual
one. The second part is devoted to the study of an incomplete market economy in
the context of a contractual economy. The formal definition of the core, its main
properties and relations with equilibrium allocations are given here. The main and
most difficult, long proofs of this part are given in a special section.The conclusion
to the main investigation and its possible policy applications forms the last section.
Chapter 1
The model of a contractual
exchange economy
1.1 The model
I consider a typical exchange economy in which E denotes the (finite dimensional)
space of commodities. Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents (traders or consumers).
A consumer i ∈ I is characterized by a consumption set Xi ⊂ E, an initial en-
dowment ωi ∈ E, and a preference relation described by a point-to-set mapping
Pi : Xi ⇒ Xi, where Pi(xi) denotes the set of all consumption bundles strictly
preferred by the i-th agent to the bundle xi. I also use the notation yi Âi xi, which
is equivalent to yi ∈ Pi(xi). So, the pure exchange model may be represented as a
triplet:
E = 〈I, E, (Xi,Pi, ωi)i∈I〉.
Let us denote by ω = (ωi)i∈I the vector of initial endowments of all traders of the
economy. Denote X =
∏
i∈I Xi and let
A(X ) = { x ∈ X |
∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ωi }
be the set of all feasible allocations and AXi(E) be its projection on Xi, i ∈ I.
Everywhere below I assume that the model E satisfies the following assumption.
(A) For each i ∈ I, Xi is a convex closed set, ωi ∈ Xi, and for every xi ∈ Xi
there exists an open convex Gi ⊂ E such that Pi(xi) = Gi ∩ Xi and xi ∈ P i(xi) \
Pi(xi)1 for every xi ∈ AXi(E).
Let L = EI denote the space of states of the economy E . In the framework of
model E , I am going to introduce and study a formal mechanism of contracting and
recontracting. This mechanism reflects the idea that any group of agents can find
and realize some (permissible) within-the-group exchanges of commodities, referred
to as contracts.
By the formal definition, any reallocation of commodities v = (vi)i∈I ∈ L, i.e.,
any vector v ∈ L satisfying ∑ vi = 0, is called a contract.
1The symbol A denotes the closure of A and \ is set for the set-theoretical difference.
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Not every kind of possible reallocation may be realized in the economy; there
are some institutional, physical, and behavioral restrictions in the economic models
of different types. This is why I equip the abstract contractual economy model
with a new element, the set of permissible contracts W ⊂ L. Thus, the contractual
(exchange) economy under study may be concisely represented by the quadruplet
Ec = 〈I, E,W , (Xi,Pi, ωi)i∈I〉.
In addition to (A), I assume everywhere below that for a contractual economy
(C) The set W is starshaped at zero in L, i.e,
v ∈ W =⇒ λv ∈ W ∀ 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
The economy Ec as well as the economy E is said to be smooth if for every i ∈ I,
Pi(xi) = {y ∈ Xi | ui(y) > ui(xi)} ∀ xi ∈ Xi
for some differentiable function ui defined on an open neighborhood of Xi.
1.2 Main contract-based concepts
In the framework of a contractual economy, I study the sets of contracts which
represent feasible allocations and introduce the operation of breaking a part of a
given set of contracts. This motivates the next important definition.
A finite collection V of permissible contracts is called a web of contracts relative
to y ∈ A(X ) if
y +
∑
v∈U
v ∈ X ∀U⊆V.
I denote by xy(U) the feasible allocation sustained by U relative to y, i.e., we put
xy(U) := y +
∑
v∈U
v.
Similarly, Vy(x) denotes the web which realizes x relative to y.
A web of contracts V relative to ω is called a web of contracts or simply a web.
Note that V = ∅ is a web relative to every y ∈ A(X ). Denoting
∆(V ) =
∑
v∈V
v,
where V is an arbitrary collection of contracts (by convention, we write ∆(∅) = 0),
we can write
xy(V ) = y +∆(V ), x(V ) = xω(V ) = ω +∆(V )
so that V being a web simply means that
xω(U) ∈ X ∀U⊆V.
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Now we are going to introduce the operations of breaking existing contracts and
signing new ones. For any contract v ∈ V , let us set
S(v) = supp(v) = {i ∈ I | vi 6= 0},
the support of the contract v. It is assumed that contract v ∈ V may be broken
by any trader in S(v), since he/she simply may not keep his/her contractual obli-
gations. Also a non-empty group (coalition) of consumers can sign any number of
new contracts. Being applied jointly, i.e., as a simultaneous procedure, these oper-
ations allow coalition T⊆I to yield new webs of contracts. The set of all such webs
is denoted by F (V, T ). Formally, I require that each element U ∈ F (V, T ) has to
satisfy the following properties:
(i) v ∈ V \ U ⇒ S(v) ∩ T 6= ∅,
(ii) v ∈ U \ V ⇒ S(v) ⊂ T ,
(iii)
∑
v∈U\V λvv ∈ W for all 0 ≤ λv ≤ 1, v ∈ U \ V .
Condition (i) means that only members of T can break contracts in V , condition
(ii) means that only members of T may sign new contracts and (iii) is a kind of
joint permissibility of new contracts, which is useful in applications of contractual
economy and whose role will be clear later. Notice also that due to the definition
of a web of contracts, a coalition can break any subset of contracts of a given web
that satisfies (i).2
Next, for the webs of contracts, I introduce the notion of domination via a
coalition. This property, being written as U Â
T
V (read: U dominates V via coalition
T ), means that
(i) U ∈ F (V, T ),
(ii) xi(U)Â
i
xi(V ) for all i ∈ T .
Notice that one can strengthen the property of domination via a coalition if in (i)
one additionally requires S(u)⊆T or S(u)⊆I\T . This fits well with the idea that the
members of T are going to be separated from the non-members of T and therefore
they have to break all non-zero contracts with the members of I \ T . Clearly, this
modification extends the set of non-dominated allocations and relaxes their stability
property.
Definition 1.1 A web of contracts V is called stable if there is no web U and no
coalition T⊆I, T 6= ∅ such that U Â
T
V .
An allocation x is called contractual if x = x(V ) for a stable web V .
The requirement that a web of contracts be stable may be relaxed as well as
strengthened. The most important possibilities are described below.
Definition 1.2 A web of contracts V is called lower stable if there is no web U and
no coalition T⊆I, T 6= ∅ such that U Â
T
V and U⊆V .
A web of contracts V is called upper stable if there is no web U and no coalition
T⊆I, T 6= ∅ such that U Â
T
V and V⊆U .
An upper and lower stable web of contracts V is called weakly stable.
2Otherwise, it would occur that an allocation realized via breaking contracts is not feasible.
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An allocation x is called lower, upper, or weakly contractual if x = x(V ) for some
lower, upper, or weakly stable web V , respectively.
It has to be clear that all the above notions of stability and domination may be
considered as “relative to some given feasible allocation”, simply use this allocation
instead of the initial ω. Also it has to be clear that the notion of a weakly stable
web (weakly contractual allocation) is really weaker than the corresponding notion
of a stable web (contractual allocation). The difference is that in the first case
the operations of breaking existing contracts and signing new contracts are applied
separately, whereas in the second case they are applied simultaneously. In the
framework of a market economy, I consider below the relations among the sets of
contractual, lower, upper, and weakly contractual allocations. They correspond to
notions well known in economic theory.
How can the process of recontracting (breaking existing contracts and signing
new ones) be expressed in economic terms? We can assume that this is something
like a taˆtonnement process (cooperative taˆtonnement), which, for example, may be
as follows. To simplify the argument let us imagine that there is an ordered list
of all coalitions. At the first stage (iteration), the coalitions, in the given order of
appearance, start to sign and/or break contacts (transitioning to webs in F (Vξ, Tξ),
where ξ is the order number of coalition Tξ). Here the first coalition “starts” from
the given initial endowment allocation ω and since there were no contracts signed
before from the web V1 = ∅. The stage, iterative loop, is finished when the last
coalition has made its choice. Next, the second stage starts where the same pro-
cess is going on assuming that the first coalition in the list deals with the web of
contracts realized at the end of the first stage. The fixed points of this iterative
process correspond to the contractual allocations and to the stable webs of con-
tracts. Clearly, the order of coalitions’ “appearance” during a stage is not essential.
Moreover, a coalition can appear several times during one stage and the order of
coalitions’ appearance can vary from stage to stage. What is really important is
that each coalition has a chance to appear in infinitely many iterations. In general,
this scenario does not impose any time restrictions on the duration of an iteration
and the number of iterations is potentially unlimited (therefore the duration of a
stage is infinitely small). Informally, it is just presumed that the process finishes
in “a reasonable time” and the economy transits to a stationary state. It is these
potentially possible stationary states that are the subject of my analysis. Notice also
that if in the iterative process, starting from some stage, one forbids the signing of
new contracts for coalitions, one can realize stationary states and webs of contracts
which are lower stable (in one of the sense described above or below: it depends on
which kind of contract breaking is permissible, i.e., whether one can break a contract
only in its entirety, partially, or even with a transition to equivalent contracts). Sim-
ilarly, by forbidding breaking contracts or by breaking contracts in a mixed regime
(at one stage forbidding signing new contracts, at another stage forbidding breaking
them, and so on), one can realize upper and weakly stable webs and contractual
allocations, respectively. A conventional presentation of the contracting and re-
contracting process, a kind of timing, is presented in Figure 1.1. Here coalition
Tξ = {1, 4} breaks a part of contracts W⊆Vξ−1 from the web Vξ−1 and signs a new
contract w = (w1, 0, 0, w4, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rln (l is a number of commodities), forming a
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- Vξ
Tξ
- Vξ+1
Tξ+1
- Vξ+2
Tξ+2
- Vξ+3 -
Tξ+3 Tξ+4
{1, 4} {1, 5} {2,4,5} {2, 3} {1, 3, 4}
Figure 1.1: Contracting and recontracting process
new web Vξ such that
ω1 +
∑
vξ−1∈Vξ−1\W
vξ−11 + w1 Â1 ω1 +
∑
vξ−1∈Vξ−1
vξ−11 ,
ω4 +
∑
vξ−1∈Vξ−1\W
vξ−14 + w4 Â4 ω4 +
∑
vξ−1∈Vξ−1
vξ−14 .
On the left hand side of these relations the summation is taken over contracts from
Vξ−1, which are not broken by coalition {1, 4}. Conversely, on the right hand side
of these relations, the summation is taken over all contracts from the web Vξ−1.
Further the web Vξ is transformed by coalition Tξ+1 = {1, 5} in a similar way and
so on.
Now we continue the list of stability property modifications, strengthening the
stability property relative to the procedure of breaking contracts. It is clear that
a web which is not lower stable cannot be long-living in a market. This is why we
restrict our attention below only to the lower stable webs. First let us introduce an
equivalence relation on the set of all such webs. This equivalence relation will allow
us to partially divide some contracts. To this end, we can define a partial ordering
on the set of all webs as follows:
U ≥ V ⇐⇒ ∃ a map onto f : U → V, such that
(i) λf(u) = u for some 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and for every u ∈ U ,
(ii)
∑
u∈f−1(v) u = v for every v ∈ V .
One can easily see that the set of contracts f−1(v) is a partition of contract v and so
the web U consists of (finite) partitions of contracts in V . The minimal elements of
the set of all webs may be called root webs. Note that it follows from this definition
that ∆(U) = ∆(V ). Now the equivalence relation may be defined as follows:
U ' V ⇐⇒ ∃ a web W such that V ≥ W & U ≥ W.
Clearly, U ' V simply means that these webs have a common root web.
Definition 1.3 An allocation x is called proper contractual (resp. lower proper
contractual, weakly proper contractual) if there exits a web V such that x = x(V )
and for every U ' V the allocation x = x(U) is contractual (resp. lower contractual,
weakly contractual).
The economic meaning of proper contractuality of an allocation is, as it was already
noted above, that we allow the agents to partially break contracts as well as to sign
new contracts (simultaneously or separately). This may be interpreted in two ways.
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First, speaking in behavioral terms , being experienced enough the agents intend to
sign many small volume contracts instead of signing one contract of large volume.
This way they gain more economic freedom through the ability to break some of the
small contracts if a necessity arises. The second way is to treat a proper contract
as a kind of a preliminary agreement. In this agreement only the rates of exchange
are rigidly defined in contrast to the volume of the contract which is flexible and
will be defined rigidly at the end of the contracting procedure. It should be clear
that due to the last definition, the property of an allocation to be stable (in any of
the senses) is essentially strengthened when we add the word “proper” to the term
“contractual” allocation. Below I refine and define the term “proper” for a single
contract and for a web.
Definition 1.4 Let V be a web. A contract v ∈ V is coherent if every web U such
that U ' {v} is lower stable relative to (x(V )−v) is taken as the initial endowments
or, equivalently for ordered preferences, if
xi(V ) ºi xi(V )− λvi ∀ 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, ∀ i ∈ I.
A subweb U ⊆ V consisting of coherent contracts is called coherent.
A subweb U ⊆ V is called proper if for every web W ' U the web (V \ U) ∪W
is lower stable.
An allocation x = x(V ) realized by a coherent web V is called (lower) coherent.
Notice that the only difference between coherent and proper webs is that in the first
case the web is stable relative to the partial breaking of any single contract, whereas
in the second case the agents may partially break any number of contracts in the
web. In general these notions are not equivalent (see Example 1.2). Moreover, even
the notions of coherent and proper contracts are not equivalent; in the latter case
(for proper contracts) breaking more than one contract in the web is also allowed.
The case of a proper web of contracts is geometrically presented in Figure 1.2 in the
coordinate system of consumer i ∈ I. Figure 1.3 gives the geometry of stable but
non-coherent and non-proper webs. In fact, by partially breaking contracts u and
6x2i
-
x1i
x¯i
Pi(x¯i)
¸ui
z
vi
zvi
¸
ui
ωi
Figure 1.2: The web {u, v} is proper
6x2i
-
x1i
x¯i
Pi(x¯i)
vi
:ﬀ
ui
ﬀ
ui
vi :
ωi
Figure 1.3: The web {u, v} is not proper
v, agent i can realize any consumption bundle of the form
ωi + λvi + µui = x¯i − (1− λ)vi − (1− µ)ui, λ, µ ∈ [0, 1],
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i.e., he/she can transit to any consumption plan from the convex hull of four points:
ωi, ωi + vi, ωi + ui, x¯i = ωi + vi + ui.
However in the case when only complete breaking of contracts is permissible, just
these four points can be realized after the breaking of contracts. Thus in geometrical
terms the difference is that while in the first case the whole “parallelogram of con-
tracts” does not intersect Pi(x¯i), in the second case it does intersect, but no vertex
belongs to Pi(x¯i).
The next proposition fully characterizes coherent contracts for convex contractual
economies. For a particular smooth case, this proposition establishes that contract
v ∈ V is coherent only if the derivative of utility by direction vi is non-negative for
each i ∈ supp(v).
Proposition 1.1 Let V be a web. A contract v ∈ V is coherent iff there exist linear
functionals pvi 6= 0 such that
〈pvi ,Pi(xi(V ))〉 > 〈pvi , xi(V )〉3 & 〈pvi , vi〉 ≥ 0 (1.1)
for every i ∈ I. Moreover, if the utility functions are smooth, (1.1) is fulfilled for
pvi = gradui(xi(V )), i ∈ I.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Let us show that (1.1) is sufficient. Assume that for every
i ∈ I, inequalities (1.1) are true, but the contract v is not coherent. Then after
partially breaking v, the broken part being 0 ≤ αv ≤ 1, the agents realize the new
allocation
xαi = xi − αvvi, i ∈ I
such that xαi Âi xi for some i ∈ S(v) so that the first part of (1.1) gives pvi xαi > pvi xi.
But then using the second part of (1.1) for this i, we obtain pvi x
α
i ≤ pvi xi, which
contradicts the previous inequality.
To establish that (1.1) is necessary, assume that the contract v ∈ V is coherent,
i.e., the web V is stable relative to the partial breaking of contract v. For each
consumer i ∈ I, let us consider the set
Ui(x) = {xi − αvvi | 0 ≤ αv ≤ 1 } ⊂ Xi.
By definition, the sets Ui are nonempty, convex, and closed. Now, since the contract
v ∈ V is coherent, it follows that
Pi(xi) ∩ Ui(x) = ∅ ∀ i ∈ I.
By assumption, there exists an open convex set Gi ⊂ E, such that Gi ∩ Xi =
Pi(xi) 6= ∅, xi ∈ Gi for the given x ∈ A(X ) and i. Now the last relations imply
Gi ∩ Ui(x) = ∅ & xi ∈ Gi ∀ i ∈ I.
3〈A, p〉 denotes the set {〈a, p〉 | a ∈ A} and A > b (A ≥ b) means a > b (a ≥ b) for all a ∈ A.
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Therefore, by the separation theorem, for each i ∈ I there exists pvi ∈ E ′ such that
pvi 6= 0 and
〈pvi , Gi〉 > 〈pvi , xi〉 ≥ 〈pvi ,Ui(x)〉.
Clearly, one can put pvi = gradui(xi(V )), i ∈ I for differentiable utility functions.
Now the first inequality implies the first part of (1.1), and the second one gives
pvi xi ≥ pvi xi − αv〈vi, pvi 〉, 0 ≤ αv ≤ 1.
Therefore, 〈vi, pvi 〉 ≥ 0.
The following corollaries characterize proper contractual allocations in terms of
coherent webs.
Corollary 1.1 Let Ec be a smooth contractual economy. Then x is lower proper
contractual iff there exists a coherent web V such that x = x(V ). Moreover, relation
(1.1) is fulfilled for pi = p
v
i = grad ui(xi(V )) and for every v ∈ V and i ∈ I.
Proof of Corollary 1.1. It follows from the definition of lower proper contractual
allocation that x can be realized by a web V = Vω(x) which is stable relative to the
procedure of partially breaking (any number of) contracts. This implies that every
contract in V is coherent and, therefore, V is a coherent web. Thus it is enough to
check that every coherent web U , such that x = x(U), is also stable relative to the
procedure of partially breaking any number of contracts, i.e., U is a proper web.
In fact, due to Proposition 1.1 for differentiable utilities, for every v ∈ Vω(x) the
functional (vector) pvi = grad ui(xi) = pi satisfies condition (1.1) for all i ∈ I. This
implies
Gi ∩Mi(x) = ∅ ∀ i ∈ I,
where
Mi(x) = { xi −
∑
v∈V
αvvi | 0 ≤ αv ≤ 1, v ∈ V } ⊂ Xi,
which completes the proof.
In particular, the last corollary states that for smooth economies, every coherent
web is proper, i.e., stable relative to the procedure of partially breaking any number
of contracts. Note that the assumption of differentiability of utilities cannot be
dropped here; appropriate examples can be easily constructed (see Example 1.2,
second part).
The previous corollary directly implies
Corollary 1.2 Let Ec be a smooth contractual economy. Then x is weakly proper
contractual iff there exists an upper stable coherent web V such that x = x(V ).
Moreover, relation (1.1) is fulfilled for pi = p
v
i = grad ui(xi(V )) and for every v ∈ V
and i ∈ I.
The next important property of proper and coherent contracts is that they can
be replaced by another proper web, keeping the lower stable property for the new
web. This fact also follows from Proposition 1.1. Recall that Vy(x) = V denotes a
web realizing the allocation x relative to the initial endowments y, i.e., x = y+∆(V ).
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Corollary 1.3 Let Ec be a smooth economy and x ∈ A(E). Then any coherent web
Vω(x) has the following inheritance property: for every (coherent) contract v ∈ Vω(x)
and every coherent web Wx−v(x), the new web U = (Vω(x) \ {v})∪Wx−v(x) is lower
stable relative to partially breaking (any number of) contracts and therefore is proper.
Proof of Corollary 1.3. Due to Proposition 1.1 (necessity), the functionals pi =
gradui(xi) satisfy (1.1) for any (coherent) contract v ∈ Vω(x), as well as for contracts
in the coherent webWx−v(x), since this web is stable relative to the partial breaking
of contracts and
∑
w∈Wx−v(x)w + x − v = x. In other words, for every i there is a
pi 6= 0 such that
〈pi,Pi(xi)〉 > 〈pi, xi〉, 〈pi, v′i〉 ≥ 0 ∀ v′ ∈ Vω(x)
and
〈pi, wi〉 ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ Wx−v(x).
Hence, joining the second relation with the first one for contracts in U and applying
Proposition 1.1 in the part of sufficiency yields the result via Corollary 1.1.
The following proposition gives the characterization of proper webs in dual terms
for the non-smooth case. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of
Corollary 1.1.
Proposition 1.2 Let V be a web of contracts and x = x(V ). Then web V is
proper, i.e., x is a lower proper contractual allocation, if and only if, there exist
linear functionals pi 6= 0, such that
〈pi,Pi(xi(V ))〉 > 〈pi, xi(V )〉 & 〈pi, vi〉 ≥ 0 ∀ v ∈ V (1.2)
for each i ∈ I.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Under assumption (A) the fact that V is a proper web is
equivalent to the condition
Gi ∩Mi(x) = ∅ ∀ i ∈ I,
where
Mi(x) = {xi −
∑
v∈V
αvvi | 0 ≤ αv ≤ 1, v ∈ U} ⊂ Xi.
Now applying the separation theorem to the sets Gi and Mi(x), we establish the
necessity of (1.2). Its sufficiency can be checked directly.
In applications of contractual economies, we will also use contracts with a stronger
stability property, so-called perfect contracts. To introduce this notion, let us first
consider another kind of equivalence relation defined on the set of all proper webs.
This (weak) equivalence relation may be define as follows: Let U and V be proper
webs, then
U ∼ V ⇐⇒
∑
u∈U
u =
∑
v∈V
v.
Clearly, U ∼ V simply means that these webs are proper and realize the same
allocation. It also has to be clear that U ' V implies U ∼ V for all proper webs U
and V . Given a proper web V , a proper web U such that U ∼ V may be referred
to as a virtual web (relative to V ).
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Definition 1.5 An allocation x is called perfectly contractual if there exits a proper
web V such that x = x(V ), and for every proper web U such that U ∼ V the
allocation x = x(U) is contractual.
The economic meaning of perfect contractuality of an allocation reflects the idea that
when signing contracts the agents should take care that not only these contracts
be small enough, as for the proper contractual behavior, but also be differently
directed (i.e. have as many different exchange proportions as possible) to provide the
opportunity to break the “unluckily directed” ones. So agents are allowed not only to
partially break contracts but also to change (in a sense) the “directions” of contracts
without loss of the low stable property. One can see an analogy with the hedge
policy,4 the main difference being that here we are speaking about the exchange-
of-goods based contracts, by the signing of which and moving into agreements via
“tacks or traverses”, the agents reach a final resource reallocation.
This may be also treated in terms of an optional agreement. In fact, in a per-
fectly contractual allocation the society is protected from the possibility that some
coalition initiates a new recontracting process. A coalition may hope that via re-
contracting, it will ‘gather more profitable harvest,’ i.e., find better consumption
programs for its members. The following scenario may take place. A coalition, act-
ing through its members may suggest to the non-members of the coalition, who are
involved in the coalition contracting, that the contracts be rewritten so that
(i) the same allocation is realized,
(ii) nobody has incentives to partially break new contracts, i. e., the new web inher-
its the lower stable property of the initial web relative to the partial breaking
of contracts.
In such a case, the non-members of the coalition may sign these new agreements
as long as they have no revealed incentives to refuse from doing so (possibly the
coalition members are simply good negotiators). But, once these new agreements
are signed, the coalition breaks a part of the contracts and signs a new contract
that as a whole provides the coalition members with better consumption bundles.
However, for a perfectly contractual allocation, this hypothetical behavior of every
coalition cannot be profitable.
The described scheme of agents’ interaction during the contract process is il-
lustrated in the following Example 1.1. Moreover this example presents a proper
contractual allocation, which is not perfect contractual.
Example 1.1 Consider an exchange economy with two commodities and with three
agents having the following characteristics. Let Xi = R2+, i = 1, 2, 3 be the agents’
consumption sets, and let preferences be defined via utility functions ui : Xi → R.
Let endowments ωi ∈ Xi and utilities have the form
u1(z) = min{4z1 + 4z2, z1 + 7z2}, ω1 = (2, 12),
u2(z) = min{4z1 + 6z2, 3z1 + 7z2}, ω2 = (54 , 94),
u3(z) = min{20z1 + z2, z1 + 20z2}, ω3 = (34 , 54).
4Hedging is a policy of investment risk neutralization conducted via using mutually exclusive
contracts, which compensates potential benefits and costs.
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Let us consider an allocation x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R6+, where
x1 = (1, 1), x2 = (2, 2), x3 = (1, 1).
This allocation can be realized by a web consisting of the only contract w = x− ω.
Since u1(x1) = 8 > 5
1
2
= u1(ω1), u2(x2) = 20 > 18
1
2
= u2(ω2), u3(x3) = 21 > 16
1
4
=
u3(ω3), then allocation x is individually rational. As in our case for each agent, as
soon as the sets Pi(xi) of strictly better consumption bundles is represented as the
intersection of some (open) cone with the vertex at the point xi and positive orthant,
then the individual rationality of x implies that the web W = {w} is proper relative
to ω. Moreover, in the next section a stronger property will be established — this
allocation x(W ) is proper contractual.
Further, coalition {1, 2} can propose to agent 3 to rewrite contract w = x − ω,
dividing it due to an allocation y ∈ X into two contracts: u = x− y and v = y− ω,
forming a virtual proper web {u, v} ∼ {w}. Agent 3 can accept this proposal,
since he/she realizes the same consumption program, and moreover, via the partial
breaking of new contracts the agent spreads his/her playing abilities to dominate
current allocation. Let us consider an allocation y = (y1, y2, y3) satisfying
h = x1 + x2 − (y1 + y2) = (−3ε, ε), ε > 0.
This condition compromises the requirement that the web {u, v} be proper. For
example one can take
y1 = (
7
4
, 2
3
), ε = 1
24
=⇒ y2 = (118 , 5524), y3 = (78 , 2524).
To check that the web {u, v} is proper, apply Proposition 1.2. Now for agent 1
consider functional p1 = (1, 7) supporting P1(x1) at point x1, obtaining
p1(x1 − y1) = 1, p1(y1 − ω1) = 1112 .
For agent 2 consider supporting functional p2 = (4, 6), having
p2(x2 − y2) = p2(y2 − ω2) = 34 .
For agent 3 take supporting functional p3 = (20, 1), for which
p3(x3 − y3) = 21124 , p3(y3 − ω3) = 2 724 .
All described functionals satisfy the sufficient condition (1.2) of Proposition 1.2,
which proves the web {u, v} to be proper. This analysis is illustrated by Figure 1.4,
where the left figure presents Edgeworth’ box,5 constructed separately for coalition
{1, 2}, the right one describes the case for agent 3 in his/her coordinate system.
Here ω˜2 = x1 + x2 − ω2, P˜2(x2) = x1 + x2 − P2(x2), y˜2 = x1 + x2 − y2 are the
presentations of initial endowments, preferences and consumption vector y2 in 1st
agent’s coordinate system, correspondingly. Notice that ω˜2 6= ω1 and y˜2 6= y1, since
ω1 + ω2 6= x1 + x2 6= y1 + y2.
5On Edgeworth’s box, see also Example 1.2 from next section.
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Figure 1.4: Edgewort’s box for coalition {1, 2} and
agent 3’s consumption separately
Finally, when agent 3 accepts the proposition of coalition {1, 2}, the members of
this coalition can break contract u = x−y, realizing the allocation y as a kind of “new
initial one,” and can sign a new contract g = (g1, g2), where g1 = x1−y1+δ(1, 1), g2 =
x2− y2−h− δ(1, 1), δ > 0. Due to the definition of h, this is a contract in fact such
that new consumption bundles are z1 = x1+ δ(1, 1), z2 = x2+(3ε− δ,−ε− δ). The
utility of the first agent for the new bundle increases due to preference monotonicity.
The utility of the second agent also increases if δ is small enough:
u2(z2) = u2(x2)+min{6ε−10δ, 2ε−10δ} = u2(x2)+2ε−10δ > u2(x2) for δ < ε/5.
So, acting in the described way, coalition {1, 2} can reach a higher consumption
level for its members (let all contracts be permissible), and studied allocation x is
not perfect contractual.
Certainly perfect contractuality is the strongest kind of allocation stability. The
next definition extends the notion of being perfect to a single contract.
Definition 1.6 Let V be a web. A coherent contract v ∈ V is perfect if every web
U such that U ∼ {v} is stable relative to (x(V ) − v), which is taken as the initial
endowments.
A web (subweb) which contains only perfect contracts is called perfect.
Remark 1.1 I would like also to mention an alternative definition of a web’s perfect
subweb of contracts.
Let V be a web. A subweb U ⊂ V is called perfect if it is proper and, for
every web W proper relative to (x(V ) −∑u∈U u) and such that W ∼ U , the web
(V \U)∪W is stable. A contract v ∈ V is called perfect if the subweb {v} is perfect.
Note that due to this definition every web containing at least one perfect contract
is stable. Notice also the difference between the two following statements for U ⊂ V
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which arises in this case: “U is a perfect subweb” and “U is a perfect web relative
to (x(V )−∑u∈U u)”. The first one implies the second, but in general the reverse is
not true (since in the first case it is allowed to break contracts in V \ U , but in the
second one it is not).
If one assumes this definition, the contracts and their webs (subwebs), perfect
in the sense of Definition 1.6, may be renamed as perfect coherent. Note also that
due to Proposition 1.1 and its corollaries, for smooth economies both variants of the
definitions of a perfect contract and of a perfect web (subweb) are equivalent.
The graphical presentation of logical relationships among various stability con-
cepts of the webs of contacts and related contractual allocations is given in Fig-
ure 1.5. In this figure the arrows show a stronger property from the nearest notions.
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Figure 1.5: The relationships and and logical connections among various contract
based concepts
Finishing the gallery of various kinds of allocation stability in a contractual
economy, let us assume that the set of permissible contracts can be represented as
a (finite) union of starshaped sets, i.e,
W = ∪Vξ.
Note that W is then the starshaped set itself and Vξ may, in particular, be convex
sets or, moreover, subspaces of L (as it is the case for incomplete markets).
Now, for a given web V , we can associate with each v ∈ V and v ∈ W , certain sets
in {Vξ} and can require that if v ∈ Vξ for a given ξ, the contract v has to be coherent
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and either proper or perfect or neither proper nor perfect. When such an association
is established, the allocation x(V ) is called complex (composition) contractual. In
other words, a complex contractual allocation is stable relative to both the procedure
of appropriately breaking contracts (depending on the set to which the contract
belongs) and the procedure of signing new (permissible) contracts. Moreover, some
additional requirements may be imposed on a web realizing an allocation. These
requirements always take the form of joint stability of contracts in the web. For
example, in the case of on incomplete market economy we can identify the sets Vξ
with the subspaces of the commodity space which exactly correspond to the states of
the world — trade exchanges (contracts) are allowed only in the present or at one and
only one event in the future. For incomplete markets, one can establish that under
some technical assumptions, the set of the GEI-equilibrium allocations coincide with
the set of all complex contractual allocations such that their corresponding webs
contain proper contracts in the present and perfect ones in future events. In these
terms, a core allocation can be described as complex contractual for which perfect
contracts are realized in future events and there are no restrictions in the present.
1.3 Contracts in a standard exchange economy
In the classical setting, it is indirectly assumed that for a pure exchange economy
all kinds of commodity exchanges are allowed, the only restriction being that the
realized consumption programs (bundles) have to belong to the agents’ consumption
sets, i.e., the allocations have to be feasible. This is why when one complements
this model with a contract-based mechanism it is logical to think that all contracts
are permissible, i.e., one may presume that W = L, where L is the space of the
economy’s states. In fact it suffices to require a little bit less. So speaking of a
standard exchange economy, we always assume that the corresponding contractual
economy is such that the setW of all permissible contracts is radial (absorbing)6 at
zero in L. In all other aspects the standard model coincides with model E . Next,
let us recall some definitions.
A pair (x, p) is said to be a quasi-equilibrium of E if x ∈ A(X ) and there exists
a linear functional p 6= 0 onto E such that
〈p,Pi(xi)〉 ≥ pxi = pωi ∀ i ∈ I.
A quasi-equilibrium such that x′i ∈ Pi(xi) actually implies px′i > pxi is a Walrasian
or competitive equilibrium.
On the other hand, x ∈ A(X ) is said to be dominated (blocked) by a nonempty
coalition S ⊂ I if there exists yS ∈ ∏i∈S Xi such that ∑i∈S ySi = ∑i∈S ωi and
ySi ∈ Pi(xi) ∀ i ∈ S.
The core of E , denoted by C(E), is the set of all x ∈ A(X ) that are blocked by
no (nonempty) coalition.
Weak Pareto boundary for E , denoted by PBw(E), is the set of all x ∈ A(X )
that cannot be dominated by the coalition I of all agents.
6A set A ⊂ L is radial at a point a ∈ A if, for every b ∈ L, λb ∈ (A− a) for all real 0 ≤ λ ≤ λb
and some λb > 0. Notice that a convex radial set is starshaped at its every point.
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An allocation x ∈ A(X ) is called individual rational if it cannot be dominated
by singleton coalitions. IR(E) denotes the set of all these allocations.
The above definitions imply
C(E) ⊂ PB(E) ∩ IR(E).
In general the reverse inclusion is true only for a two-consumer economy.
The next important notion, fruitfully working in the theory of economic equilib-
rium, is the concept of fuzzy core. Recall that any vector
t = (t1, . . . , tn) 6= 0, 0 ≤ ti ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ I
may be identified with a fuzzy coalition, the real number ti being interpreted as the
measure of agent i in the coalition. A coalition t is said to dominate (block) an
allocation x ∈ A(X ) if there exists yt ∈∏I Xi such that∑
i∈I
tiy
t
i =
∑
i∈I
tiωi ⇐⇒
∑
i∈I
ti(y
t
i − ωi) = 0 (1.3)
and
ytiÂi xi ∀ i ∈ supp(t) = {i ∈ I | ti > 0}. (1.4)
Conditions (1.3), (1.4) may be equivalently rewritten in the form7
0 ∈
∑
i∈I
ti(Pi(xi)− ωi).
The set of all feasible allocations which cannot be dominated by fuzzy coalitions is
denoted by Cf (E) and is called the fuzzy core of the economy E .
Next I would like to make several remarks on the concept of optimality by
Pareto (Pareto boundary). First recall a stronger concept of optimality, sometimes
called the strong Pareto boundary . Assume that every relation Âi is irreflexive and
transitive.8 Then x = (xi)I ∈ A(X ) is a strong Pareto optimum if there is no
z = (zi)I ∈ A(X ) such that
xi 6Âi zi ∀ i ∈ I & ∃ j ∈ I : zj Âj xj.
For preordered preferences,9 ºi this requirement is equivalent to
ziºi xi ∀ i ∈ I & ∃ j ∈ I : zj Âj xj.
Let us denote by PBs(E) the strong Pareto boundary , the set of all strong Pareto
optimal allocations. The definitions imply PBs(E) ⊂ PBw(E).
There is one more possibility of defining the optimality concept in an economic
model. It takes an intermediate position between the two notions considered above.
7Admitting some inaccuracy in the next and further relations, I will sometimes identify a
singleton set with its element (a vector).
8It is known that every strict binary relation Â is irreflexive and transitive if it is defined as a
strict component of a non-strict relation º that is reflexive and transitive.
9This is a reflexive, complete and transitive non-strict binary relation.
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We will see below that exactly this kind of optimality is realized by upper contractual
allocations.
Let us call an allocation x = (xi)I ∈ A(X ) strictly Pareto optimal if there is no
coalition S ⊂ I for which there exists an yS ∈∏i∈S Xi such that∑i∈S ySi =∑i∈S xi
and ySi Âi xi for each i ∈ S. In other words, x is an allocation in the core of the other
economy, which differs from the original one in only one aspect, namely, allocation
x is taken as the initial endowments. In my opinion, the last concept of optimality
presents the most precise form of optimality by Pareto.
Denote by PB(E) the strict Pareto boundary . It is easily seen from the definitions
that
PBs(E) ⊂ PB(E) ⊂ PBw(E).
Therefore, if under some conditions one can show that an x = (xi)I ∈ PBw(E) is
Pareto strongly optimal (this is the case if, for example, the preferences are locally
non-satiated, which we have here due to (A), and x ∈ intX),10 then the allocation
x is strictly Pareto optimal as well.
The next theorem establishes relationships between the core and contractual
allocations.
Theorem 1.1 Let Ec be a contractual economy such that W = L, and let x be an
allocation. Then:
(i) x is contractual ⇐⇒ x ∈ C(E) ∩ PB(E),
(ii) x is upper contractual ⇐⇒ x ∈ PB(E),
(iii) x is lower contractual ⇐⇒ x ∈ IR(E),
(iv) x is weakly contractual ⇐⇒ x ∈ IR(E) ∩ PB(E).
Proof of Theorem 1.1. The necessity of (i)–(iv) directly follows from the definitions.
To check their sufficiency, for x ∈ A(X ) let us consider the web Vω(x) consisting of
only one contract v = x−ω. This is really a web since, by assumption, (x−ω) ∈ W .
A routine checking of Definitions 1.1, 1.2 completes the proof.
Remark 1.2 One might think that the assumption W = L made in the last the-
orem is redundant and can be changed by a weaker requirement that the set W is
radial at zero. In such a case one can realize the allocation x using the web con-
sisting of contracts (x− ω)/r for a sufficiently large natural r. However, this is not
enough; in order for (x− ω)/r to be in the core, we would have also to modify the
rule of domination by coalition, to require that the dominating coalition “breaks
all links” with the complementary coalition, i.e., the supports for all contracts in
the dominating web have to be contained in this coalition or in its complement.
Moreover, it is necessary to allow a coalition to sign new contracts and exclude re-
quirement (iii) from the definition of sets F (V, T ). Also the problems with lower and
weak contractuality can arise since by breaking some of the contracts, the coalition
members can realize any allocation of the form ω + m
r
(x− ω), m = 0, . . . , r.
10Moreover, it is well known that if the preferences are strictly monotonic and Xi = Rl+ (l is
a number of commodities) for all i, then the concepts of strong and weak Pareto optimality are
equivalent.
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The next theorem characterizes the equilibrium allocations in terms of the proper
contractual ones.
Theorem 1.2 Let Ec be a smooth contractual economy, the set W be radial at zero
in L, and x be an allocation such that x ∈ intX. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(i) x is an equilibrium allocation.
(ii) x is optimal by Pareto and there exists a coherent web V realizing this alloca-
tion, i.e., x = x(V ) such that V is coherent and upper stable.
(iii) x is a proper contractual allocation.
(iv) x is a perfectly contractual allocation.
Moreover, if (x, p) is an equilibrium and V is a web realizing x = x(V ), then V
is a coherent web if and only if pvi = 0 ∀ v ∈ V , ∀ i ∈ I.
Remark 1.3 The analysis of the theorem’s proof shows that the implication (i)⇒(iii)
is true in the general case for the non-smooth preferences and without the require-
ment x ∈ intX, i.e., in the standard exchange economy every equilibrium is a proper
contractual allocation.
Notice also that the theorem’s condition x ∈ intX is fulfilled automatically if
Pi(ωi) ⊂ intX holds for all i ∈ I.
Recall also that due to Theorem 1.1(ii), statement (ii) of Theorem 1.2, in which
the optimality by Pareto of the allocation x is claimed, is equivalent to the existence
of a coherent and upper stable web realizing this allocation.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. To establish the equivalence of (i)–(iv) recall that under the
theorem’s conditions, x ∈ A(X ) is optimal by Pareto iff there exists an i ∈ I such
that for p = grad ui(xi)
〈Pj(xj), p〉 > 〈p, xj〉 ∀ j ∈ I.11 (1.5)
Next let us notice that (iv)⇒(iii)⇒(ii). To establish (ii)⇒(i), apply Proposition
1.1 to obtain pvi ≥ 0 for all v ∈ V and i ∈ I. Summing up over v ∈ V for every
i ∈ I, we arrive at
〈p,∆i(V )〉 ≥ 0 =⇒ pxi ≥ pωi.
This, due to the feasibility of x, implies pxi = pωi for all i which by (1.5) yields the
equilibrium properties of (x, p).
Now I prove (i)⇒(iv). Let v = vr = (x − ω)/r, where the natural r is chosen
based on the assumption that W is absorbing, and define the set V to consist of
the r identical copies of the contract v. Clearly, V is a web. Now the equilibrium
properties of the pair (x, p) imply pvi = 0 ∀ v ∈ V , ∀ i ∈ I and therefore (1.1) is true
(one can take p = grad u1(x1) as the equilibrium price vector for x). Applying the
11In particular, it implies that gradui(xi) and graduj(xj) coincide up to a normalization for all
i 6= j.
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sufficiency part of Proposition 1.1, one concludes that V is a coherent and, moreover,
proper web. Now let U ∼ V for a proper web U . Once again due to Proposition
1.1 (necessity), the properness of U implies pui ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ U , ∀ i ∈ I. But then the
contract specification (
∑
i∈I ui = 0) implies pui = 0 ∀u ∈ U , ∀ i ∈ I. Finally, if
for a T⊆I, T 6= ∅ and a web W ∈ F (U, T ) we have W ÂT U , it follows from the
equilibrium definition that
〈p, yi(W )〉 > 〈p, xi(U)〉 ∀ i ∈ T.
Consequently, summing up these inequalities over i ∈ T , we arrive at the contra-
diction with the contract specification of w ∈ W \ U (since S(w) ⊂ T , because of
W ∈ F (U, T ) and (ii)). The final part of theorem is also clear.
Next let us consider several examples demonstrating the difference between the
various notions of contractual allocation. Of course, for this difference to be realized
when the partial breaking of contracts is allowed, the conditions of Theorem 1.2
have to be invalid, and either the utilities have to be non-smooth or the allocation
has to belong to the boundary of X.
The following example, borrowed from Kozyrev (1982), shows that for non-
differentiable utility functions a proper contractual allocation may not be an equi-
librium.
Example 1.2 Consider a two-commodities exchange economy with two consumers
in which Xi = R2+ and the preferences are defined onto R2+ by the strict monotonic
utility functions
u1(x
1, x2) = 2
√
x1x2 + x1 + x2, u2(x
1, x2) = 2
√
x1x2 + x1 + x2 +min{x1, x2},
where the upper index shows the number of a commodity. For the initial endow-
ments, take the vectors
ω1 = (1, 0), ω2 = (0, 1), ω¯ = ω1 + ω2 = (1, 1), ω = (ω1, ω2) = ((1, 0), (0, 1)).
In further considerations, we make use of the “Edgeworth’s box,” the well known
subset of R2,
EB(ω¯) = {x ∈ R2 | 0 ≤ x ≤ (1, 1) = ω¯}.
One can interpret x ∈ EB(ω¯) as the consumption of the first consumer and (ω¯− x)
as the consumption of the second one. This point may be also associated with the
allocation (x, ω¯ − x).
A simple analysis shows that the Pareto boundary in this example is the set
PB = co{ (0, 0), (1, 1) } = { x ∈ EB(ω¯) | x1 = x2 = α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 },
i.e., the diagonal of EB(ω¯).
Since every equilibrium allocation is optimal by Pareto and, if it is an inte-
rior point of the box, the price vector has to coincide up to a normalization with
gradu1(x1), the vector (1, 1) has to be an equilibrium price vector. Clearly, the
points (1, 1) and (0, 0) are not equilibrium allocations. Consequently, p = (1, 1) is
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the only (up to a normalization) equilibrium price. Using the budget constraints
pxi = pωi, one can easily find the unique equilibrium allocation which corresponds
to the first agent’s consumption bundle (1
2
, 1
2
) in the Edgeworth’s box.
The core in this economy with two consumers coincides with the set PB ∩ IR
which, in turn, is the set of all contractual and weakly contractual allocations and
can be easily calculated to be
PB ∩ IR = { x ∈ PB | u1(x) ≥ u1(ω1), u2(ω¯ − x) ≥ u2(ω2) } = co{ (14 , 14) , (45 , 45) }.
Next let us find the set of all proper contractual allocations. Clearly, this is the
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Figure 1.6: Non-smooth preferences
set of all points x = (α, α) in PB ⊂ EB for which the derivatives of the utility
functions u1 and u2 are not positive in the directions of h1 = ω1 − (α, α) and
h2 = ω2 − (1− α, 1− α), i.e., we need to solve the system of equations
∂h1u1(α, α) ≤ 0, ∂h2u2(1− α, 1− α) ≤ 0.
A direct calculation gives
gradu1(α, β) = (
√
β/α + 1,
√
α/β + 1)
for all α > 0, β > 0 and
gradu2(1− α, 1− β) = (
√
(1− β)/(1− α) + 2 ,
√
(1− α)/(1− β) + 1)
for α > β > 0, 1 − α > 0. Calculating the inner products and substituting α = β
(i.e., passing to the limit for β → α) yields
1− 2α ≤ 0, 5α− 3 ≤ 0.
28 The model of contractual exchange economy
As a result, the set of proper contractual allocations is described as co{ (1
2
, 1
2
) , (3
5
, 3
5
) }
and does not coincide with (but contains!) the set of equilibrium allocations. Figure
1.6 illustrates the analysis conducted.
In this example it seems to be interesting to clarify the structure of the set corre-
sponding to another new theoretical concept, the set of all lower proper contractual
allocations. With this in mind, let me describe allocations which cannot be dom-
inated by the coalition {1} relative to the partial breaking of the contract x − ω
(i.e., the web consisting of only one contract). In the Edgeworth’s box, they are the
points (α, β) satisfying the condition
∂h1u1(α, β) ≤ 0, h1 = ω1 − (α, β).
Now calculating the directional derivative in the form of the inner product and
substituting the value for ω1, we obtain for (α, β)À 0
(1− α)(
√
β/α + 1)− β(
√
α/β + 1) ≤ 0,
which can be rewritten as√
β/α ≤ (√α +
√
β)2 − 1 ⇐⇒ (√α +
√
β) ≤ (√α+
√
β)2
√
α.
Dividing both sides by
√
α+
√
β > 0 yields, after transformations,√
βα ≥ 1− α ⇐⇒ β + 2 ≥ 1
α
+ α.
Therefore, the set we are interested in is the part of the epigraph of the curve
x21 =
1
x11
+ x11 − 2 inside the rectangle 0 ≤ (x11, x21) ≤ (1, 1). This set is shown in
Figure 1.7.
It is harder to carry out a similar analysis for agent 2 by purely analytical
means. This is why we also turn to geometrical considerations. Let us choose an
individual-rational point (α, β) for agent 2 in the coordinate system of agent 1,
which lies in the interior of the box. If this point belongs to the diagonal , i.e., α = β,
then as we have seen above, it satisfies the required property only if α ≤ 3/5.
Now assume that the point (α, β) does not belong to the diagonal, i.e., α 6= β
and consider the second agent’s indifference curve (in the coordinate system of the
1st agent) passing through this point. This curve corresponds to the graph of a
concave function; therefore, if our point is desired, i.e., ∂h2u2(1 − α, 1 − β) ≤ 0 for
h2 = ω2− (1−α, 1−β), then every point of the curve to the right of (α, β) is also a
desired one. Next, if α ≤ β, the right hand side of the curve intersects the diagonal
at a point (γ, γ) where, by the above argument, γ ≤ 3/5. Moreover, for α < β, we
have u2(1 − α, 1 − β) = u1(1 − α, 1 − β) + 1 − β. Now calculate the gradient and
pass to the limit for (α, β) → (γ, γ), γ ≥ 0. The result is that (γ, γ) must satisfy
the condition
〈(2, 3), (γ − 1, γ)〉 ≤ 0 ⇒ γ ≤ 2/5.
Consequently, in the coordinate system of agent 1 the desired set can be viewed as
the ordinate set of the curve consisting of three parts: for the interval [0, 2
5
], this is
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Figure 1.7: Lower proper contractual allocations
the graph of a concave function which is equal to 0 at 0 and 2
5
at 2
5
; for the interval
[2
5
, 3
5
] the curve coincides with the diagonal; for the interval [3
5
, 1] this is again the
graph of a concave function which is equal to 3
5
at 3
5
and 0 at 1. Thus we arrive at
a nonconvex set. The intersection of this second set with the first one represents
the set of all lower proper contractual allocations in the Edgeworth’s box. Being
intersected with the Pareto boundary (the diagonal) in addition, this set represents
the already known set of all proper contractual allocations; see Figure 1.7.
In the framework of this example, one can also demonstrate the difference be-
tween the notions of coherent and proper webs as well as between the corresponding
stability properties. Let us consider an allocation, in which agent 1 consumes the
bundle (3
5
, 3
5
); see Figure 1.8. Set hˆ1 = (0, 1) − (35 , 35) = (−35 , 25) and calculate the
derivative of the function u1 at the point (
3
5
, 3
5
) in the direction of hˆ1:
∂hˆ1u1(
3
5
, 3
5
) = 〈(2, 2), hˆ1〉 = −2
5
< 0.
For the allocation considered, the second agent’s consumption bundle is a point of
non-differentiability of his/her utility function, but its derivative in the direction of
hˆ2 = (1, 0)− (25 , 25) = (35 ,−25) can be easily calculated as the limit for (α, β)→ (35 , 35)
of the inner product of the vector-gradient of u2 calculated at the point (1−α, 1−β),
β > α > 0, and the vector hˆ2. Since for β > α > 0, 1− β > 0,
gradu2(1− α, 1− β) = (
√
(1− β)/(1− α) + 1,
√
(1− α)/(1− β) + 2);
upon calculating the inner products and substituting α = β = 3
5
, one obtains
∂hˆ2u2(
2
5
, 2
5
) = 〈(2, 3), hˆ2〉 = 0.
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Figure 1.8: Coherent non-proper contractual allocations
Next, for a sufficiently small ε > 0, take allocation
ωε = ω − εw
to be the initial endowments and consider web V ε = {v, εw} where
v = (v1, v2), v1 = −v2 = (35 , 35)− (1, 0) = (−25 , 35)
and
w = (w1, w2), w1 = −w2 = (3,−2)
is the contract in which the first consumer exchanges 2 units of commodity 2 for 3
units of commodity 1. For example, one can take ε = 1
6
. Obviously
ωε + v + εw = ((3
5
, 3
5
), (2
5
, 2
5
)),
i.e., the allocation considered is realized by the web V ε relative to the endowments
ωε. The above calculations of the derivatives in the directions of hˆ1, hˆ2 together
with the previous calculations of the derivatives in the directions of h1 and h2 (for
α = 3
5
), show that each contract in the web V ε is coherent relative to ωε. However,
for every ε ∈ (0, 1
6
] the web V ε is not proper since after the breaking of a half of εw
and after the partial breaking of the contract v, the broken part being δ = 5
2
ε < 1,
it realizes the allocation for which the first agent’s consumption program has the
form
1
2
ε(3,−2) + (1− 5
2
ε)(−2
5
, 3
5
) + (1, 0)− ε(3,−2) = (3
5
, 3
5
)− ε(1
2
, 1
2
) = xε1.
Therefore, the proposed partial breaking of contracts is, in fact, profitable for the
second agent since it results in an increase in her/his consumption by ε(1
2
, 1
2
). This
proves that the web V ε is not proper relative to ωε.
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The above example stimulates a more careful study of the mathematical prop-
erties of proper (and perfectly) contractual allocations in situations where the con-
ditions of Theorem 1.2 are invalid. To this end, let us proceed as follows.
Let us begin with the discussion of lower proper contractual allocations. Due
to the definition, they are the allocations x(V ) which can be realized by a web
of contracts V , which are stable relative to the procedure of partially breaking
contracts. Since in the standard market model every contract is permissible, web V
can be replaced by web ∆V = {u} consisting of only one contract u = ∑v∈V v =
x− ω. It is easily seen that the lower stability of the original web implies the same
type of stability for web ∆V . Therefore, one can restrict the analysis of proper (not
only lower) contractual allocations to the webs having the form {x − ω}. Further
it will be clear that all the conclusions can be easily applied to the case of webs
consisting of multiple contracts. However, in the case of webs consisting of a single
contract, one can directly conclude from the definition that an allocation x ∈ A(X )
is lower proper contractual if and only if
[xi, ωi] ∩ Pi(xi) = ∅ ∀ i ∈ I, (1.6)
where
[xi, ωi] = {λxi + (1− λ)ωi | 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1}.
Now the definitions of stability via Theorem 1.1 (ii) easily imply that weakly proper
contractual allocations are exactly the allocations that are optimal by Pareto and
satisfy (1.6).
The proper contractual allocations can be characterized in similar terms as fol-
lows. Breaking the 1− λ part of the contract x−ω and signing the new contract v,
the members of S ⊂ I realize the collection of consumption bundles yS = (ySi )S such
that
∑
S y
S
i =
∑
S(λxi + (1 − λ)ωi)). Since the definition of a proper contractual
allocation forbids this type of domination, the allocation x must belong to the core
of the economy with the initial endowments λx + (1 − λ)ω = ωλx = ωx ∈ [x, ω],
which I denote by C(Eλx ). Thus an allocation x is proper contractual if and only if
it belongs to the core of each economy C(Eλx ), i.e.,
x ∈
⋂
ωx∈[x,ω]
C(Eλx ).12
I continue by similarly describing the perfectly contractual allocations. In order
to do this, we actually only need to understand to which kinds of the “initial en-
dowment allocations” one can transit upon breaking a “virtual web” for {x − ω}.
First of all note that in this case we may restrict the analysis to the webs consisting
of two contracts. To see this, let V be a proper virtual web realizing the alloca-
tion x, i.e., V ∼ {x − ω}, and let U⊆V be the set of all contracts broken by some
coalition. Form the web W = {∆(U),∆(V \ U)} in which all broken contracts are
aggregated into one contract and all preserved contracts into another one. Clearly,
12Notice that this formula also implies that in the Edgeworth’s box the proper contractual
allocations coincide with the weakly proper contractual ones. In fact, in an economy with just
two agents the core is equal to PB ∩ IR. However, lower stability implies xi º (λxi + (1− λ)ωi),
i = 1, 2, i.e., x ∈ IR(Eλx ), which together with the Pareto optimality gives the result.
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webW is proper,W ∼ V , and by breaking contract ∆(U) one realizes the allocation
that coincides with the allocation obtained from V as a result of breaking contracts
U⊆V , which completes the argument. So let W = {u, v} ∼ {x − ω}. Then by
partially breaking contracts in this web, one can realize any point y in the convex
hull of the set consisting of four points: x, ω, ω + v, ω + u. It is clear that the web
{x− y, y−ω} constructed for this y is also proper. The opposite is also true: if this
web is proper, y ∈ A(X ) can be realized via breaking a part of the contracts in a
virtual web realizing x. Thus if we define
PC = {y ∈ A(X ) | web {x− y, y − ω} is proper},
the set of all perfectly contractual allocations can be described in the form
x ∈
⋂
y∈PC
C(Ey) ⇐⇒ x is perfectly contractual, (1.7)
where y is the vector of initial endowments in model Ey. To better understand the
meaning of this formula, the structure of the set PC needs to be clarified. Figure
1.11 below provides an illustration.
Next let us turn to the description of the objects under study in terms of dual
cones. This description is of mathematical interest in its own right and, as we will
see below, can considerably contribute to the understanding of various concepts of
contractual allocation in the situations we are interested in.
The cone
K∗ = {p ∈ E ′ | 〈p,K〉 ≥ 0}
is said to be the dual cone of set K ⊂ E. For every i ∈ I, let us set
Γ(xi) = {p ∈ E ′ | 〈p,Pi(xi)− {xi}〉 ≥ 0}.
This is the dual cone of the Pi(xi)−{xi}. It is well known (and easy to prove applying
the separation theorem) that for every weakly optimal by Pareto allocation, there
corresponds a (non-zero) linear price functional p ∈ E ′ such that
〈p,Pi(xi)〉 ≥ 〈p, xi〉 ∀ i ∈ I.
The necessity part of this statement is always true (for convex, locally non-
satiated preferences), whereas its sufficiency part is true for the interior points of
the consumption sets (if in addition the sets Pi(xi) are open in Xi). One can see
that this description is very close to being a precise characterization of optimality
by Pareto13. Accordingly, it is not inaccurate if we call the allocations which satisfy
this property quasi-optimal by Pareto. In the above terms, they can be described
as the allocations satisfying
Γ(x) =
⋂
I
Γ(xi) 6= {0}. (1.8)
13In the framework of nonstandard analysis, i.e., making use of nonstandard prices, one can
obtain a description of strictly Pareto optimal allocations in the form of strict inequalities and
without the latter interior point assumption. However, I will not elaborate on this here and
restrict myself to the standard analysis.
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For every i ∈ I, set
G(xi − ωi) = {p ∈ E ′ | 〈p, xi − ωi〉 ≥ 0}, G(x) =
⋂
I
G(xi).
Now one can easily see that x is a quasiequilibrium ⇐⇒⋂
I
[G(xi − ωi) ∩ Γ(xi)] 6= {0} ⇐⇒ G(x) ∩ Γ(x) 6= {0}. (1.9)
Assume that x ∈ intX.14 Then similarly applying the separation theorem and
(1.6), we see that an allocation x is lower proper contractual ⇐⇒
G(xi − ωi) ∩ Γ(xi) 6= {0} ∀ i ∈ I ⇐⇒
∀ i ∈ I ∃ pi ∈ E ′, pi 6= 0 : 〈pi,Pi(xi)〉 ≥ 〈pi, xi〉 & pixi ≥ piωi. (1.10)
Thus, in this case an allocation is weakly proper contractual if (1.8) holds in addition.
Next let us study the properties of the proper contractual allocations.
Lemma 1.1 If an allocation x is proper contractual, then for each coalition S⊆I
there exists pS ∈ E ′, pS 6= 0 such that
〈pS,Pi(xi)〉 ≥ 〈pS, xi〉 ∀ i ∈ S & pS
∑
S
xi ≥ pS
∑
S
ωi. (1.11)
If in addition x ∈ intX, the opposite is true, i.e., if there exist linear pS ∈ E ′,
pS 6= 0 satisfying (1.11) ∀ S⊆I, then x is a proper contractual allocation.
In other words, the lemma states that for a proper contractual allocation, each
coalition can find internal-coalition prices such that, first, they are “suitable” for
every member of the coalition (the first inequality in (1.11) that may be treated
as a form of the coalition efficiency) and, second, the contract x − ω is coalition-
profitable relative to these prices (the second inequality in (1.11)). Thus, the proper
contractual allocations are precisely the allocations which satisfy the condition of
coalition-profitability (1.11). The statement of the lemma is similar to the description
of the weakly proper contractual allocations given in (1.10), the only difference being
that the lemma claims the existence of internal-coalition prices, satisfying (1.11) for
every coalition, whereas in (1.10) just for singleton coalitions . This is why the
weakly proper contractual allocations are just individually profitable and Pareto
optimal (i.e., the coalition of all agents is profitable as well). Notice also that the
statement of Lemma 1.1 may be rewritten in the equivalent form⋂
S
Γ(xi)
⋂
G(
∑
S
xi −
∑
S
ωi) 6= {0} ∀ S⊆I.
Of course, in the general case, this requirement is weaker than (1.9). This is why
in order to establish that a proper contractual allocation is a (quasi)equilibrium, we
14This condition together with (A) is essential for establishing sufficiency; as for necessity, it
may be dropped (in view of (A)).
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need to make additional assumptions to guarantee that (1.9) is equivalent to the
last relation (for example, that the utilities are differentiable and x ∈ intX), which
is actually a considerably stronger assumption than we made in Theorem 1.2.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. It follows from the above analysis that an allocation x is
proper contractual iff it cannot be improved upon by any coalition S⊆I relative to
the endowments xλ = λx + (1 − λω) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let PS(yS) =
∏
S Pi(yi) for
yS = (yi)i∈S ∈
∏
S Xi = X
S and let xλS = (x
λ
i )i∈S. Then for a fixed λ, the last
property can be written in the form
PS(xS)
⋂
(ES + x
λ
S) = ∅, ES = {yS ∈ ES |
∑
S
yi = 0}. (1.12)
Therefore,
PS(xS)
⋂
(ES + [x
S, ωS]) = ∅, xS = (xi)i∈S, ωS = (ωi)i∈S,
where [xS, ωS] is the segment in ES connecting the points xS and ωS (the convex
hull of two points). Due to assumption (A), since the set ES + [x
S, ωS] is convex
one can apply the classical separation theorem, which gives the existence of a linear
functional (vector) pS = (pi)i∈S ∈ (E ′)S, pS 6= 0, such that
〈pS,PS(xS)〉 ≥ 〈pS, ES + [xS, ωS]〉.
The right-hand side of this inequality is a bounded from above subset of R. Hence the
inequality may be true only if the set 〈pS, ES〉 is bounded. Since ES is a subspace
of ES, it follows that 〈pS, ES〉 = {0}. A standard argument then implies that
pi = pj = p ∀ i, j ∈ S (because pSzS = 0 for all zS ∈ ES such that zSi = −zSj ∈ E
and zSt = 0 for t 6= i, j, t ∈ S). Moreover, p 6= 0 since pS = (p, . . . , p) 6= 0.
Next, assumption (A) implies that PS(xS) is convex and xS ∈ PS(xS). Therefore,
it follows from the last inequality that
〈pS, xS〉 ≥ 〈pS, [xS, ωS]〉 ⇐⇒ p
∑
S
xi ≥ p
∑
S
ωi.
Moreover, arguing by contradiction, we obtain
〈pS,PS(xS)〉 ≥ 〈pS, xS〉 = sup〈pS, [xS, ωS]〉 ⇐⇒ 〈p,Pi(yi)〉 ≥ 〈p, xi〉 ∀ i ∈ S.
Now to complete the proof of the lemma’s necessity, just substitute pS = p.
The lemma’s sufficiency follows from (A) and the condition x ∈ intX, since in
this case the inequalities in the first part of (1.11) are actually strict, which together
with the second part of (1.11) implies (1.12) for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 1.1 allows us to discover new interesting (and sometimes unexpected)
properties specific to proper contractual allocations. For example, it follows from
this lemma that every proper contractual allocation in a 2-replicated economy is an
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equilibrium if the economy contains just two agents or, alternatively, if there is one
agent with differentiable preferences.15
First we would like to recall the concept of a replicated economy. Given a
natural r ∈ IN, the r-fold replica of E is the model Er in which every consumer of
the original model defines a type of economic agent represented by her/his r precise
copies. For convenience, the agents in Er are numbered by double indexes (i,m),
i ∈ I, m = 1, . . . , r. It is assumed that Xim = Xi, ωim = ωi, and the preferences,
being defined on and taking values in Xim, are defined by Pim = Pi. Notice that
for every allocation x = (xi)I in the initial model, there canonically corresponds
an allocation in the replica according to the rule xim = xi ∀ i,m. The opposite is
also true if the allocation is symmetric, i.e., when identical agents consume equal
bundles (this is so-called equal treatment).
Replicas play an important role in the analysis of perfect competition, especially
for proving the well known Edgeworth’s conjecture which states that under the
conditions of perfect competition the core and equilibria coincide. It is the replica’s
symmetric allocations and the corresponding allocations in the original model that
is the main subject of this analysis, with every coalition in the replica being allowed
to dominate the original allocations by not necessarily symmetric inter-coalition
allocations.
Theorem 1.3 (Kozyrev 1982) Assume that an economy has two agents or, alter-
natively, there exists an agent with a smooth preference whose consumption choice is
an interior point of his/her consumption set. Then every allocation, which is proper
contractual in the 2-fold replica economy, is a quasiequilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Consider first the case of an economy with two agents. Let
I = {1, 2} and let x = (x1, x2) be a proper contractual allocation in the 2-fold replica
economy. It suffices to establish (1.9) for x. To this end, apply Lemma 1.1 and rela-
tion (1.11) to the coalitions S ′ = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)} and S ′′ = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2)}.
This results in the existence of nonzero vectors p′ and p′′ ∈ E ′ such that
p′, p′′ ∈ Γ(x1) ∩ Γ(x2)
and
p′(2x1 + x2) ≥ p′(2ω1 + ω2), p′′(x1 + 2x2) ≥ p′′(ω1 + 2ω2).
Since x1 + x2 = ω1 + ω2, the last inequalities are equivalent to
p′x1 ≥ p′ω1 & p′′x2 ≥ p′′ω2.
If one of these inequalities is actually an equality, due to the feasibility of
x, either p′ or p′′ belongs to the intersection in (1.9). Suppose both in-
equalities are strict. Then, the first component of the 2-dimension vector
(p′(x1 − ω1), p′(x2 − ω2)) is strictly greatly than zero, the second one is strictly
less than zero, and their summation is equal to zero. The same is true for the
15This result was first proved by Kozyrev (1982), who applied the technique of subdifferential
calculus (to concave utility functions, etc.) which restricts the generality. Lemma 1.1 and the
proof of the next theorem are new.
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vector (p′′(x1 − ω1), p′′(x2 − ω2)), in which the first component is strictly less than
zero. Next find a real 0 < α < 1 such that αp′(x1 − ω1) + (1− α)p′′(x1 − ω1) = 0
(set α = −p′′(x1 − ω1)/ [p′(x1 − ω1)− p′′(x1 − ω1)]). Then it is clear that then
[αp′ + (1− α)p′′](x2 − ω2) = 0. Now let us set p = αp′ + (1 − α)p′′ 6= 0. Hence, by
construction, we obtain p(xi−ωi) = 0 ⇒ p ∈ G(xi−ωi), i = 1, 2, which due to the
convexity of Γ(xi) implies p ∈ Γ(xi), i = 1, 2. This proves (1.9).
Now let us show (1.9), assuming that there exists an agent with a smooth pref-
erence in the economy. First of all note that due to this assumption, if there exists
a nonzero vector p ∈ Γ(xi) ∀ i ∈ I, it is unique up to a normalization. Next apply
Lemma 1.1 and relation (1.11) to the coalitions Si = {(i, 2)} ∪ I × {1}, i ∈ I, all
the coalitions in which the i-th type consumer is presented by two agents and all
the other consumers just by one agent. It follows that there exists a nonzero vector
p ∈ Γ(xi) ∀ i ∈ I, which is common for all coalitions Si, such that for every i ∈ I
p[
∑
j∈I
xj + xi] ≥ p[
∑
j∈I
ωj + ωi] =⇒ pxi ≥ pωi.
Since x is feasible, pxi = pωi for all i and the proof is complete.
Arguing along the lines of the proof of Lemma 1.1, one can obtain a dual de-
scription of perfectly contractual allocations. Having this in mind, let us make use
of formula (1.7) to describe the proper web {x−y, y−ω} in dual terms. As in (1.6),
we conclude that {x− y, y − ω} is proper ⇐⇒
co{xi, yi, ωi, xi − yi + ωi} ∩ Pi(xi) = ∅ ∀ i ∈ I.
Now applying the separation theorem, we see that this web is proper if and only if
for each i there exists a nonzero pi ∈ E ′ such that
〈pi,Pi(xi)〉 ≥ pixi ≥ 〈pi, co{xi, yi, ωi, xi − yi + ωi}〉.
In this chain of inequalities, the second one is equivalent to pixi ≥ piyi ≥ piωi.
Figures 1.9, 1.10, 1.11 illustrate the above argument.
Thus we obtained a description of PC, the set of all allocations which can be re-
alized via breaking a part of the contracts in a virtual web realizing x. We can apply
this description to give a characterization of the perfectly contractual allocations.
In fact, being proper contractual, a perfectly contractual allocation has to satisfy
(1.11) and, in addition, for every y ∈ A(X ), the condition
∀ i ∈ I ∃ pi ∈ E ′, pi 6= 0 : 〈pi,Pi(xi)− {xi}〉 ≥ 0 & pixi ≥ piyi ≥ piωi (1.13)
has to imply x ∈ C(Ey). Moreover, since it has to be true for all y′ ∈ [x, y] (substitute
y′ for y in the last relations), i.e., since x is proper contractual relative to y, one can
apply Lemma 1.1. Thus condition (1.13) has to imply that for each coalition S⊆I,
there exists a nonzero pS ∈ E ′ such that
〈pS,Pi(xi)〉 ≥ 〈pS, xi〉 ∀ i ∈ S & pS
∑
S
xi ≥ pS
∑
S
yi.
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Figure 1.11: Perfect contractual allocations in
the Edgeworth’s box for non-smooth preferences
Next let us consider the elaborated characterization and Lemma 1.1 in the con-
text of Example 1.1.
Example 1.1 (prolongation) Applying Lemma 1.1 let us show that the studied
allocation x = (x1, x2, x3),
x1 = (1, 1), x2 = (2, 2), x3 = (1, 1)
is, in fact, proper contractual. With this in mind, let us establish that relation (1.11)
is true. For singleton coalitions this fact was proved above, and we need to check
(1.11) for two-elements and for grand coalitions. To do this let us describe the dual
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cones corresponding to current allocation x:
Γ(x1) = cone{(4, 4), (1, 7)},
Γ(x2) = cone{ (4, 6), (3, 7) },
Γ(x3) = cone{(20, 1), (1, 20)},
where coneA denotes the conic hull of set A. We obtain
Γ(x1) ∩ Γ(x2) ∩ Γ(x3) = Γ(x1) ∩ Γ(x2) = cone{(2, 3), (2, 423)}.
In particular we see that for a grand coalition of all agents, the vector pI = (2, 3) is
suitable. For coalition {1, 2} this vector is also suitable, since then
〈(2, 3), x1 + x2 − ω1 − ω2〉 = 〈(2, 3), (−14 , 14)〉 > 0.
Since
(1, 7) ∈ Γ(x1) ∩ Γ(x3) & 〈(1, 7), x1 + x3 − ω1 − ω3〉 = 〈(1, 7), (−34 , 14)〉 > 0,
vector (1, 7) can be applied in (1.11) for coalition {1, 3}. Finally, for coalition {2, 3},
vector (2, 3) is suitable again, since then we obtain
〈(2, 3), x2 + x3 − ω2 − ω3〉 = 〈(2, 3), (1,−12)〉 > 0.
Thus, due to Lemma 1.1, the allocation x is proper contractual.
Ending, let us apply the characterization of perfect contractual allocation elabo-
rated above and show once more that studied allocation x is not perfect contractual.
We saw above that web {x− y, y − ω} is proper and, therefore, virtual for the web
{x− ω} where y = (y1, y2, y3) is such that
y1 = (
7
4
, 2
3
), y2 = (
11
8
, 55
24
), y3 = (
7
8
, 25
24
).
Consider coalition S = {1, 2} and check condition pS(x1 + x2) ≥ pS(y1 + y2) for
pS ∈ Γ(x1) ∩ Γ(x2). Normalizing pS via condition (pS)1 = 2, find 3 ≤ (pS)2 ≤ 423 .
Now we can conclude
pS(x1 + x2 − y1 − y2) = pS(−3ε, ε) = −6ε+ ε(pS)2 ≤ −113ε < 0, ε = 124 ,
i.e., condition pS(x1 + x2) ≥ pS(y1 + y2) is false for every 0 6= pS ∈ Γ(x1) ∩ Γ(x2),
which is what we sought to prove.
Next we turn to a comparative analysis of the proper contractual allocations and
the fuzzy core allocations. Let us begin with a study of the specific properties of
the fuzzy core allocations.
The definition of an allocation that cannot be dominated by the fuzzy coalitions
(see relations (1.3) and (1.4)) implies that x ∈ Cf (E) is equivalent to16
0 /∈ co[∪
I
(Pi(xi)− ωi)],
16It is easy to see that domination by the fuzzy coalitions is equivalent to domination by the
normalized coalitions corresponding to the weight coefficients of a convex combination, i.e., for a
dominating coalition t one may always think that
∑
i∈I ti = 1.
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which, by the separation theorem, implies that the elements of the fuzzy core are
quasiequilibria. Below I propose a close but somewhat different description, given
in “geometrical” terms. To this end, let us consider the sets
Ωi(xi) = co(Pi(xi) ∪ {ωi}), i ∈ I.
Due to the convexity of Pi(xi),
co(Pi(xi) ∪ {ωi}) = ∪
0≤λ≤1
[λPi(xi) + (1− λ)ωi] = ∪
0≤λ≤1
λ(Pi(xi)− ωi) + ωi, i ∈ I.
This implies that the condition z + ω ∈ ∏I Ωi(xi), where ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn), is
equivalent to the existence of 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 and yi ∈ Pi(xi), i ∈ I such that
z = (λ1(y1 − ω1), . . . , λn(yn − ωn)).
Hence, due to (1.3), (1.4),
x ∈ Cf (E) ⇐⇒ @ z ∈ EI , z 6= 0 : z + ω ∈
∏
I
Ωi(xi) &
∑
i∈I
zi = 0
⇐⇒
∏
I
Ωi(xi)
⋂
{(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ EI |
∑
i∈I
zi =
∑
i∈I
ωi} = {ω}.
In the case of a 2-agent economy, this condition may be rewritten in the form
Ω1(x1) ∩ (ω¯ − Ω2(ω¯ − x1)) = {ω1}, ω¯ = ω1 + ω2.
Moreover, in this case the fact that fuzzy coalition (t1, t2) > 0, ti ≤ 1 dominates
allocation (x1, x2) can be illustrated as follows. Consider the Edgeworth’s box. Due
to the definition of domination, in a nontrivial case it can occur only if t1 6= 0 & t2 6= 0
and
∃ y1, y2 ∈ R2+ : y1 Â1 x1, y2 Â2 x2 & t1(y1 − ω1) = t2(ω2 − y2).
Let z2 = ω¯ − y2 be the consumption bundle of the first agent when the second
one consumes y2. This vector represents y2 in the natural coordinate system of the
first agent’s consumption bundle. Substituting z2 in the right hand side of the last
relation we obtain
t1(y1 − ω1) = t2(ω2 − (ω¯ − z2)) = t2(z2 − ω1) ⇐⇒ z2 = ω1 + t1
t2
(y1 − ω1), t2 6= 0.
Geometrically, it means that the points y1 and z2 lie on one line with the point ω1,
and on one side of this line, with respect to ω1 (i.e., they belong to a ray starting
at ω1). Moreover, due to the definition of domination, we have y1 ∈ P1(x1) and
z2 ∈ ω¯ − P2(x2). Hence,
(x1, x2) /∈ Cf (E) ⇐⇒ ∃ ray starting at the point ω1, which intersects
both sets, P1(x1) and ω¯ − P2(ω¯ − x1) = P˜2(x1).
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See Figure 1.12 for graphic illustration of the above analysis in the Edgeworth’s box
for a 2-goods economy. In this case, an allocation x lying in the fuzzy core is equiva-
lent to the convex hulls of P1(x1)∪{ω1} and of [ω¯ − P2(ω¯ − x1)] ∪ {ω1} having only
one point, ω1, in common (alternatively, in the terms of cones with common vertex
ω1, which are going across the sets of all strictly preferred consumption bundles).
At this point, one may be curious to see in an Edgeworth’s box illustration
of Theorem 1.3 why the set of proper contractual allocations in the 2-fold replica
economy E2 coincides with the set of (quasi)equilibrium allocations. To this end,
let me show the abilities of domination by coalitions consisting of two agents of one
type and of one agent of the other type. Let v = x1 − ω1 = ω2 − x2. By definition,
the coalition S ′ = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2)} dominates17 x if there exist y1 ∈ P1(x1) and
y2 ∈ P2(x2) such that for some real λ ∈ [0, 1]
y1−ω1−λv+2(y2−ω2+λv) = 0 =⇒ y′1+
1
2
(1+λ)v = ω2− y2, y′1 =
1
2
(y1− x1).
Let Υ = 1
2
(P1(x1)− x1); notice that it contains y′1. Then the fact that the coalition
S ′ does not dominate x can be written as
(Υ + [
1
2
v, v]) ∩ [ω2 − P2(ω¯ − x1)] = ∅.
Similarly, if coalition S ′′ = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)} dominates x, one can find y1 ∈
P1(x1) and y2 ∈ P2(x2) such that for some real λ ∈ [0, 1]
2(y1−ω1− λv) + y2−ω2+ λv = 0 =⇒ 4y′1+ (2− λ)v = ω2− y2, y′1 =
1
2
(y1− x1).
Therefore, the absence of domination by S ′′ means
(4Υ + [v, 2v]) ∩ [ω2 − P2(ω¯ − x1)] = ∅.
17One may think without loss of generality that the second type agents consume the same bundle.
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Notice that due to (A), we have Υ = 1
2
(P1(x1) − x1) ⊂ 2(P1(x1) − x1) = 4Υ.
Hence, combining the above relation we arrive at the following condition, which is
equivalent the fact that there is no domination by any of the two coalitions, S ′ and
S ′′:
(Υ + [
1
2
v, 2v]) ∩ [ω2 − P2(ω¯ − x1)] = ∅. (1.14)
Adding ω1 to both sets being intersected, the latter can be rewritten as
(Υ + [ω1 +
1
2
v, ω1 + 2v]) ∩ [ω¯ − P2(ω¯ − x1)] = ∅.
The second set in the intersection on the left-hand side is precisely the set of all
second agent’s strictly preferred consumption bundles in the coordinate system of
the first agent. The last relation and the previous constructions can be illustrated in
the Edgeworth’s box, where P˜2(x2) = ω¯ − P2(ω¯ − x1) (see Figure 1.13). Moreover,
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Figure 1.13: Proper-contractual in 2-fold replica
(1.14) provides an alternative way to see that under the conditions considered, a
proper contractual allocation is a quasiequilibrium. Apply the separation theorem
to the sets on the left-hand side of (1.14) to obtain a nonzero p ∈ E ′ such that
〈p,Υ+ [1
2
v, 2v]〉 ≥ 〈p, [ω2 − P2(ω¯ − x1)]〉.
Next notice that 0 ∈ clΥ and, in view of (A), x2 ∈ clP2(ω¯ − x1). Hence, due to the
definition of v = ω2 − x2, it follows that
〈p, [1
2
v, 2v]〉 ≥ pv ⇐⇒ pv = 0 ⇐⇒ pxi = pωi, i = 1, 2.
The fact that p supports Pi(xi) at the point xi for i = 1, 2 can also be easily derived
now.
Chapter 2
Contract-based incomplete
markets
2.1 Incomplete market model
In the general framework of a pure exchange economy E , let us consider a model with
two periods t = 0, 1, in which there are l kinds of physically different (potentially)
commodities available either today (with certainty) or tomorrow (contingent on
each of a finite number s of possible future states of nature). So for this (market)
economy, the total space of commodities E is associated with the space Rl(s+1).
For convenience, we denote by σ = 0 the state of nature today. At each state
σ = 0, 1, . . . , s, there is a spot market for each of the l commodities, whose price-
vector is pσ ∈ Rl; at time 0, there exists also a financial market for k assets that
deliver a random return across the states at t = 1. The price for j-s asset is
represented by the value qj and q = (q1, q2, . . . , qk) is the price-vector for assets. Let
Π = {(p, q) ∈ Rl(s+1) × Rk | ∀σ ‖pσ‖ ≤ 1, ‖q‖ ≤ 1}
denote the set of admissible prices for commodities and assets, the elements of which
will be denoted by pi = (p, q). In a general setting, the asset structure is given by
the map
A(·) = [aj(·)]j=1,...,k,
defined on Rl(s+1)+k × X; the image A(pi, x) is a (s × k)-matrix of which the j-th
column vector aj(pi, x) denotes, given p, q and x, the financial return of asset j across
states of nature at period 1, denominated in units of account. In other words, the
vector aj(pi, x) is the promised monetary-valued payoff in all future states of nature
associated with buying a unit of j-th asset. Now, if we denote
λj(x, pi) = (−qj, aj(x, pi)), Λ =
( −q
A(x, pi)
)
,
then the total transfer of wealth across different states of the world, which some agent
can obtain from the market of assets with respect to his/her portfolio z = (z1, . . . , zk)
(trade program for assets), is described by the vector
Λ · z = z1
[ −q1
a1(pi, x)
]
+ · · ·+ zk
[ −qk
ak(pi, x)
]
.
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In a general incomplete market setting, consumer i, being ordinary described by a
consumption set Xi ⊂ E and a preference correspondence Pi : Xi ⇒ Xi, is also in
addition characterized by a portfolio set Zi ⊂ Rk and vector-function
αi(·) = (ασi (·))σ=sσ=0, ασi : Rl(s+1)+k ×X → R,
giving for each state the wealth of consumer i, given prices p = (pσ)
σ=s
σ=0, q and
actions of the other agents. Therefore each consumer i can choose the net of his/her
consumption bundles under the following budget constraints, having the following
vector-inequality form:
Pxi ≤ αi(x¯, pi) + Λzi, xi ∈ Xi, zi ∈ Zi,
where the matrix
P =
 p0 0. . .
0 ps
 =
 p0 . . . 0... P1
0

defines the consumption cost operator. Note that “squared product” (the standard
notation p x′ denoting the vector (pσ · x′σ)σ=sσ=0, x′ ∈ Rl(s+1)), commonly used in
incomplete market theory, coincides with the ordinary matrix-vector product Px′,
x′ ∈ Rl(s+1). The incomplete market model under study is also equipped with the
vector of endowment ω¯ ∈ E of the whole economy or simply with the vectors of
individualized consumers’ initial endowments ωi ∈ Xi, i ∈ I and for this case I put
ω¯ =
∑
i∈I ωi.
Now let us recall the equilibrium concepts applied in incomplete market theory.
Let us resume with Z =
∏
i∈I Zi, the list of data concerning the portfolio re-
strictions. Taking as given the actions of the other agents and a market system of
commodity and asset prices, the budget set of i-th consumer is
Bi(p, q, x) = { x′i ∈ Xi | ∃zi ∈ Zi : p x′i ≤ αi(p, x) + Λ(p, q, x)zi }.
Definition 2.1 A financial Z-equilibrium is a pair of actions and admissible prices
((x¯i, z¯i)i∈I , (p¯, q¯)) ∈ X × Z × Π such that
(i) for each i ∈ I : p¯ x¯i = αi(p¯, x¯) + Λ(p¯, q¯, x¯)z¯i and
Pi(x¯i)
⋂
Bi(p¯, q¯, x¯) = ∅,
(ii)
∑
i∈I x¯i = ω¯ and
∑
i∈I z¯i = 0.
Classically, (i) means that each (x¯i, z¯i) is an optimal feasible budget plan for
agent i, given (p¯, q¯, x¯). Condition (ii) is a couple of market clearing conditions under
the assumption that no production or intertemporal storage is possible1 and assets
are in zero net supply. In (ii), if
∑
i∈I αi(p¯, x¯) = p¯ ω¯, the condition
∑
i∈I z¯i = 0 is
obviously redundant when the rank of Λ(p¯, q¯, x¯) is equal to k.
1More exactly, informally intertemporal storage abilities are accumulated in agents’ initial en-
dowment vectors ωi = (ωσi ), and via it, in agents’ profit functions.
44 Contract-based incomplete markets
The concept of consumption sets of the agents expresses the idea of sociological
and physiological restrictions on consumption bundles, independently of any limi-
tation of resources. A similar interpretation for portfolio sets seems more difficult
and this is why economic theory is most interested in the particular case of financial
Z-equilibrium in which there are no restrictions on trade with assets.
Definition 2.2 A financial or GEI equilibrium is a pair of actions and admissible
prices, representing financial Z-equilibrium for which Zi = Rk for each i ∈ I.
Note that if
∑
i∈I αi(p¯, x¯) = p¯ ω¯, even if the matrix Λ(p¯, q¯, x¯) has a rank
strictly less than k, the condition
∑
i∈I z¯i = 0 is redundant in the following
sense: by changing the portfolio of any one agent, it is easy to associate a financial
equilibrium with any ((x¯i, z¯i)i∈I , p¯, q¯) satisfying all the other conditions of Definition
2.2 but not necessarily
∑
i∈I z¯i = 0.
There are three basic types of assets which are of practical significance and
generally considered in the literature. The first one is described by real assets — the
vectors: a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Rls, which as vector-columns form the matrix A = [aj]j=kj=1,
i.e.,
A =
 a
1
1 a
2
1 . . . a
k
1
...
...
. . .
...
a1s a
2
s . . . a
k
s

— the (sl × k)-matrix of commodity returns from assets which defines the matrix
of financial returns across the future states of the world by formula
A(x, p, q) = (pσ · ajσ)σ=1,...,s
j=1,...,k
.
Note that the concept of financial equilibrium with real assets is inflation-proof,
i.e., the changes of price levels (the type of its normalization) on future and present
markets do not influence resource allocation (due to the homogeneity of budget
constraints).
If a consumption bundle eσ ∈ Rl is chosen as a unit of “numeraire” for σ ≥ 1,
numeraire assets are given by ajσ = r
j
σeσ, r
j
σ ∈ R and in this particular case of real
assets, we have the second type of the matrix of returns from assets:
A(x, p, q) = ((pσ · eσ)rjσ)σ=1,...,s
j=1,...,k
.
With purely financial securities, the matrix A(x, p, q) does not depend on p, q, and
this is the third type of nominal assets.
It has to be clear that it makes sense to consider the notion of the core for an
incomplete market economy with only real assets and so that the agents’ profit func-
tions are defined through the value of individualized vectors of initial endowments,
i.e., for
ασi (p, q, x) = pσω
σ
i , ωi = (ω
0
i , . . . , ω
s
i )
on the domain of ασi (·) and for all i, σ. Note that in this case the i-th consumer
budget constraints have the form
Pxi ≤ Pωi +
( −q
P1A
)
zi, xi ∈ Xi, zi ∈ Rk, (2.1)
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where the matrix
P1 =
 p1 0. . .
0 ps

defines the consumption cost operator for future events, i.e., for t = 1. This matrix
is the submatrix of P, which is formed by the rows σ = 1 to σ = s and omitting the
first l zero columns. Clearly in this considered case, we have A(x, p, q) = P1A.
As a result this model under study may be written in the following short form:
E in = 〈I, E, (Xi,Pi, ωi)i∈I , A〉.
The reader can find more on incomplete market theory in Geanakoplos (1990), Magill
and Shafer (1991).
Being imposed for E in, given the above assumptions (A) and (C), we can also as-
sume that every Xi is “rectangular” over the states of the world, i.e., Xi =
∏s
σ=0X
σ
i ,
Xσi ⊂ Eσ and
(S) Preferences are local nonsatiated in each spot market, i.e., for every σ and
each i ∈ I
xσi ∈ Pi(xσi , x−σi ) ∩ Eσ, ∀ xi = (xσi , x−σi ) ∈ AXi(E),
holds, where x−σi = (x
0
i , . . . , x
σ−1
i , x
σ+1
i , . . . , x
s
i ) is a fragment-vector of xi, comple-
menting xσi to xi, and Eσ is a subspace of E, related with the event σ; AXi(E)
denotes the projection of all feasible allocations on Xi.
2.2 Contractual approach in incomplete markets
In framework of this incomplete market model E in next I consider the model of
contractual economy, for which we define the set W of all permissible contracts as
follows
W =W in =
σ=s⋃
σ=0
Vσ,
where Vσ ⊂ EI are some subspaces of EI corresponding to markets in all possible
states of the world. More exactly these subspaces are defined by
Vσ = {v ∈ EI | vmi = 0, ∀m 6= σ, m = 0, . . . , s, ∀ i ∈ I}
for all σ = 1, . . . , s, and for the present (t = 0) I put
V0 = {v ∈ EI | ∃ zi ∈ Rk : vσi = Aσzi, ∀ i ∈ I, ∀σ = 1, . . . , s},
where Aσ are the submatrices of matrix A corresponding the future states of the
world, i.e., Aσ = (a
j
σ)j=1,...,k. Note that if I were to apply incomplete market with
portfolio constraints, then I would change the previous formula, and in addition
require that zi ∈ Zi. Also from the last definition one can easily check that v ∈ V0
is a contract, i.e.,
∑
i∈I vi = 0, if and only if there are exist such zi ∈ Rk, i ∈ I, that∑
i∈I zi = 0 and v
σ
i = Aσzi holds for every i ∈ I and σ = 1, . . . , s. This allows us, for
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the convenience of below considerations, to transit to the initial incomplete market
terms and to work with portfolios for assets instead of with deviations of goods.
Namely, to avoid misunderstanding, I shall apply the following specific notion of
contract for the present, — this is the couple w = (v, z), such that v = (vi)i∈I ∈ EI ,
z = (zi)i∈I ∈ (Rk)I and∑
i∈I
vi = 0,
∑
i∈I
zi = 0 & v
σ
i = 0, ∀ i ∈ I, ∀σ = 1, . . . , s
hold. Also, for convenience of notation, I will identify the contract v ∈ Vσ for σ ≥ 1,
which formally belongs to the space EI with the vector vσ from (Rl)I .
It follows from above that for incomplete markets the contracts are classified
according to the state of the world they belong and therefore each web V may be
represented by the form
V =
s⋃
σ=1
V σ
⋃
W,
where V σ is the set of all contracts relative to the state σ 6= 0, and W is the set
of contracts in the present. The structure of permissible contracts in an incomplete
market is presented in Figure 2.1.
§¨ ¥¦t = 0
σ = 2σ = 1 σ = 3
ª R?
6 6 6666
§¨ ¥¦1st asset §¨ ¥¦2nd asset
I µ I µ
future events
no direct ways
Figure 2.1: A contracts’ structure for incomplete market
Let a web V be given. Then by definition consumer i’s consumption bundle yi
corresponding to this web satisfies
y0i (V ) = ω
0
i +
∑
(u,z)∈W
u0i ,
yσi (V ) = ω
σ
i +
∑
v∈V σ
vσi +
∑
(u,z)∈W
Aσzi, σ = 1, . . . , s.
(2.2)
Now, if we denote
∆0i (V ) = ∆
0
i (W ) =
∑
(u,z)∈W
u0i ,
∆zi = ∆zi(W ) =
∑
(u,z)∈W
zi, ∆
σ
i (V
σ) =
∑
v∈V σ
vσi , σ = 1, . . . , s
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and put ∆σi (V ) = ∆
σ
i (V
σ) + Aσ∆zi for σ ≥ 1, then the total deviation of agent i’s
initial endowments may be represented by the vector
∆i(V ) = (∆
0
i (W ),∆
1
i (V
1) + A1∆zi, . . . ,∆
s
i (V
s) + As∆zi),
which by definition is the i’s fragment-vector of the total deviation of initial alloca-
tion ω. Now relations (2.2) may be rewritten in the form
y0i (V ) = ω
0
i +∆
0
i (W ),
yσi (V ) = ω
σ
i +∆
σ
i (V
σ) + Aσ∆zi, σ = 1, . . . , s.
(2.3)
The definition of a set of all permissible contractsW in and also the rules of operating
with webs, described in section 1, imply the following properties for breaking and
signing contracts in an incomplete market:
• the agents can break any contracts;
• for given event σ = 1, . . . , s the agents can sign new contracts – commodity
exchanges at this event;
• for event σ = 0 (i.e. in the present) they can sign new contracts by assets and
by the commodity exchanges for date t = 0; the agents can do it in a common
regime, as well as in a separate style.
Thus the situation with breaking contracts and with signing new ones is non-
symmetrical, since consumers can break any kind of contract, but they can sign
only the contracts relative to a fixed state of the world. This non-symmetry appears
due to specific incomplete market properties and fits with item (iii) of the definition
of F (V, T ): the set of possible webs, that may be realized by a coalition T after
breaking some contracts and signing new ones.
Now in the context of incomplete market let us consider some notions of con-
tractual allocations given in section 1. To characterize the core and equilibrium
allocations, we shall use two kinds of complex contractual allocations, also called
first and second contractual allocations.
Definition 2.3 Let V =
s⋃
σ=1
V σ
⋃
W be a weakly stable web such that all contracts
from V σ are perfect for all σ ≥ 1. The allocation x = x(V ) is called semi-perfect
contractual if for every virtual Uσ ∼ V σ, Uσ⊆Vσ, σ ≥ 1, there is no S⊆I and
V̂⊆
s⋃
σ=1
Uσ, satisfying
supp(vˆ)⊆S, ∀ vˆ ∈ V̂ (2.4)
and such that for t = σ = 0, there is a contract w′ = (u′, z′), supp(w′)⊆S such that
yi(V
′) Âi xi(V ), ∀ i ∈ S
is true for web V ′ = {w′} ∪ V̂ .
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Let Dsp(E in) denote the set of all semi-perfect contractual allocations in E in.
In reference to Definition 2.3, note that allocation x is semi-perfect contractual if
there exists such a weakly stable web realizing this allocation, in which all contracts
for the future states of the world are proper and, moreover, every one of these
contracts can be changed by any weakly equivalent (virtual) web without the loss
of stability in the following sense. In the present, a coalition considers the ability to
create an autonomous subeconomy. To do this it has to break all contracts in the
present and moreover, the coalition is forced to break some contracts at every future
event, using a virtual equivalent web, such that all contracts in which there is non-
trivial exchange with some non-members of the coalition are broken. The condition
(2.4) realizes this requirement. When this deal is realized, the coalition can sign
some new contract in the present. In so doing the breaking of given contracts and
the signing of a new one is considered to be simultaneous procedure. Of course the
fact that a coalition can use virtual contracts for future events is very important.
Notice only that these contracts and the property of contracts from V σ being perfect,
one has to consider relative to contracts from Vσ — only in the limits of this set
of permissible contracts one may pass to (weakly) equivalent contracts. Let us also
be reminded that the fact that we apply perfect contracts for future events implies
that there is no coalition which is able to increase its members’ utility by breaking
a part of equivalent contracts and the signing a new one relative to any given future
state of the world . This is why this ability is not considered in the semi-perfect
contractual allocation definition directly, but of course it is taken into account in
further considerations.
It has to be clear that as in the general case, the stability of considered kind can
increase if for a given fixed event, one changes the group of contracts in the web by
their sum.2 It follows that the subsystem of all contracts in the present, W , can
be changed by
∑
w∈W w and, therefore, condition (2.4) and the other requirements
of Definition 2.3 have to be fulfilled, subject to breaking the only contract w′ =∑
w∈W w.
Definition 2.4 Let V =
s⋃
σ=1
V σ
⋃
W be a weakly contractual web such that for
σ ≥ 1 all contracts from V σ are perfect and (for σ = 0) all contracts from W are
proper. Then the complex contractual allocation x = x(V ) is called proper-perfect
contractual, if for every virtual Uσ ∼ V σ, σ ≥ 1, and for every partition W˜ ' W
there is no S⊆I and V̂⊆
s⋃
σ=1
Uσ
⋃
W˜ such that for t = σ = 0 there is a contract
w = (u, z), S(w)⊆S, such that
yi(V
′) Âi xi(V ), ∀ i ∈ S
is true for the web V ′ = {w} ∪ V̂ .
Denote Dcp(E in) as the set of all proper-perfect contractual allocations from E in.
2Note that it cannot be done for any subsystem of contracts, since one has to be sure the
summed contract is permissible.
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Notice that due to Definition 2.4, contracts in the present may be partially
broken and, moreover, condition (2.4) is not imposed. Each of these differences
increases the requirements for the stability of allocation. However remark (it will
be clear later) that condition (2.4) does not play a special role in proper-perfect
contractual allocations and may be added to the definition. The coalition of all
agents, I, plays the main role. This situation is similar to ordinary markets, where
the most important thing is that the allocation be Pareto optimal and all contracts
are proper. Thus a proper-perfect contractual allocation differs from a semi-perfect
contractual allocation only in that we can partially break contracts in the present for
the first kind of allocation, but for a semi-perfect contractual allocation non-proper
contracts in the present are allowed and they may be broken only as a whole. In
particular, note that Dcp(E in)⊆Dsp(E in) is always true.
My analysis and the key properties of complex contractual allocations in incom-
plete markets is based on the following observation. Let some semi-perfect contrac-
tual allocation x¯ ∈ Dsp(E in) be given. Consider and fix some event σ ≥ 1 and fix
consumption for other events. Further let us consider the reduced model Eσ, the
model in which only exchanges and the deviation of consumption bundles in state
σ are allowed. If in this model one considers ωσi + Aσ∆zi(W ) to be the vectors of
agents’ initial endowments, then one can transit to the standard exchange economy
in which consumption sets are the appropriate sections of initial sets. Now if one
presumes model E in is smooth, then due to assumption x¯i ∈ intXi and from the
perfectness of contracts from V σ and their upper stability in the reduced model, one
can in a standard manner conclude that,3 there is vector-price pσ such that
pσ = (p
1
σ, . . . , p
l
σ) = λigrad|xσ
i
ui(x¯i), pσ 6= 0, λi > 0, i ∈ I, (2.5)
and (x¯σi )i∈I is an equilibrium relative to x
σ
i and subject to fixed x¯
−σ
i , where x¯
−σ
i =
(x¯0i , . . . , x¯
σ−1
i , x¯
σ+1
i , . . . , x¯
s
i ), and grad|xσ
i
ui(x¯i) denotes the subvector of the gradient
of utility function, calculated at the point x¯i, and corresponding to the state σ ≥ 1.
Therefore, due to assumptions, the equalities in budget constraints are fulfilled for
x¯σi , i.e.,
pσx¯
σ
i = pσω
σ
i + pσAσzi, σ = 1, . . . , s,
for zi = ∆zi and each i. Now denote the total vector-price in future markets by
p1 = (pσ)
σ=s
σ=1, pσ ∈ Rl, σ ≥ 1.
Define
H = H(p1) = {x ∈ Rnl(s+1) | ∃ z ∈ Rnk : ∑i∈I zi = 0 &
pσx
σ
i − pσωσi = pσAσzi, ∀σ = 1, . . . , s, ∀ i ∈ I}.
By construction we have x¯ ∈ H. Now put
Hi = Hi(p1) = {xi ∈ Rl(s+1) | ∃ zi ∈ Rk : pσxσi − pσωσi = pσAσzi, σ = 1, . . . , s};
this is (in fact) the projection of subspace H onto a subspace corresponding to agent
i’s consumption bundles. Clearly,
Hi = H + ωi, H = {y ∈ Rl(s+1) | ∃ z ∈ Rk : pσy = pσAσz, ∀σ ≥ 1}. (2.6)
3Note that for this assumption, (S) plays an important role.
50 Contract based incomplete markets
takes place for all i.
The useful properties of incomplete market complex-contractual allocations
(more exactly, for semi-perfect contractual and therefore for proper-perfect con-
tractual) are stated in the following lemma, the proof of which is given in the next
section.
Lemma 2.1 Let E in be a smooth incomplete market and x¯ ∈ intX∩Dsp(E in). Then
(i) x¯ ∈ H and after an appropriate breaking of contracts of goods and assets, the
allocation does not leave space H,
(ii) x¯ is not Pareto-dominated via an allocation from space H,
(iii) x¯ is not Pareto-dominated via an allocation from space
Eσx¯ = {y = (yi)I ∈ EI | y−σi = x¯−σi , ∀ i ∈ I}, ∀σ ≥ 0.
The items (ii) and (iii) of this lemma and the above considerations induce the
following terminology.
An allocation x ∈ A(X ) is called σ-Pareto optimal, σ = 0, . . . , s, if it is not
Pareto dominated via an allocation y ∈ A(X ) from the space
Eσx¯ = {y = (yi)I ∈ EI | y−σi = x¯−σi , ∀ i ∈ I}.
An allocation, which is σ-Pareto optimal for every σ ≥ 0, is called partially
Pareto optimal.
Let x = (xσ)
σ=s
σ=0 ∈ A(X ) be some σ-Pareto optimal allocation. The nonzero
vector (functional) pσ ∈ Rl is called σ-Pareto prices if
pσy
σ
i > pσx¯
σ
i , ∀ (yσi , x¯−σi ) ∈ Pi(x¯i), ∀ i ∈ I. (2.7)
Notice that for smooth preferences and if x ∈ intX, relation (2.7) is equivalent to
the existence of γσi > 0, satisfying
grad|xσ
i
ui(xi) = γ
σ
i pσ, ∀ i ∈ I. (2.8)
A collection of vectors (pσ)
σ=s
σ=0, pσ ∈ Rl is called (partial) Pareto prices if (2.7)
is true for all σ = 0, . . . , s.
An allocation from H is called Pareto H-optimal if it cannot be Pareto-
dominated via another allocation from H = H(p1).4 Using (2.6) in a standard
manner, one can see that an allocation is Pareto H-optimal if and only if it cannot
be Pareto-dominated via an allocation y ∈ A(X ), for which y− ω ∈ HI , and this is
the specific form of constrained Pareto optimality.
The next lemma, whose proof is given in the next section, states the key prop-
erties of H-optimal allocations.
4Notice that now prices p1 may not be partially Pareto optimal.
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Lemma 2.2 Let E in be an incomplete market and x¯ ∈ intX. Let p1 = (pσ)σ=sσ=1.
Then x¯ = (x¯i)I ∈ H(p1) is Pareto H(p1)-optimal if and only if the following property
is true. Let i0 ∈ I be an arbitrarily chosen and fixed agent. Then there exist such
p¯ = (p¯0, p¯1, . . . , p¯s) that p¯σ 6= 0 for all σ = 0, . . . , s and
p¯yi > p¯x¯i ∀ yi ∈ Pi(x¯i) | ∃ zi ∈ Rk : pσ(yσi − ωσi ) = pσAσzi, ∀ σ ≥ 1 (2.9)
is true for all i ∈ I, i 6= i0. For i0, a stronger property is true:
p¯yi0 > p¯x¯i0 , ∀ yi0 ∈ Pi0(x¯i0). (2.10)
Note that the analysis of the lemma proof shows that x¯ ∈ intX is essential just to
obtain the strict inequality in relation (2.9). The next corollary gives us a convenient
reformulation of Lemma 2.2 for a smooth case.
Corollary 2.1 In Lemma 2.2 conditions, let us assume that E in is smooth market
and let ui(.) be a utility function for i ∈ I. Then for allocation x¯ to be Pareto
H(p1)-optimal, the following property is necessary and sufficient. Let
p¯ = grad ui0(x¯i0)
for some i0. Then for all i 6= i0 and each σ ≥ 1, there exist real αi > 0 and some
real λσi , σ ≥ 1, such that
grad|
x0
i
ui(x¯i) = αip¯0,
grad|xσ
i
ui(x¯i) = αip¯σ + λ
σ
i pσ, ∀ σ ≥ 1
hold and, moreover,
∑σ=s
σ=1 λ
σ
i pσAσ = 0 is fulfilled.
Applying Lemma 2.2 and its corollary to a smooth economy, then x¯ ∈ intX is
also Pareto optimal in each future market and (nonzero) spot prices satisfy pσ =
γσi grad|xσ
i
ui(x¯i), γ
σ
i > 0, i.e., prices (uniquely) are derived from necessary optimal
conditions (hence they are Pareto prices), one can immediately conclude
Corollary 2.2 Let E in be a smooth complete market and x¯ ∈ intX. Suppose x¯ is
partially Pareto optimal and let p1 = (pσ)
σ=s
σ=1 be a bundle of σ-Pareto prices (i.e.,
(2.7) is true for σ ≥ 1). Presume also that x¯ = (x¯i)I ∈ H(p1) and is Pareto H(p1)-
optimal. Then there exists a vector p¯ = (p¯0, p¯1, . . . , p¯s) such that p¯σ = βσpσ for some
βσ > 0 and all σ ≥ 1, so that for q¯ =
∑σ=s
σ=1 p¯σAσ and every i ∈ I
p¯0y
0
i − p¯0ω0i + q¯zi > p¯0x¯0i − p¯0ω0i + q¯z¯i, ∀ yi ∈ Pi(x¯i) (2.11)
is true for all zi, z¯i ∈ Rk, which satisfy
p¯σ(y
σ
i − ωσi ) = p¯σAσzi & p¯σ(x¯σi − ωσi ) = p¯σAσz¯i, σ = 1, . . . , s.
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Proof of Corollary 2.2. To verify this corollary, first note that since (pσ)
σ=s
σ=1 is a
bundle of σ-Pareto prices, in corollary conditions (2.8) is true. Now let us take
vector p¯ = grad ui0(xi0) for i0 ∈ I from the statement of Lemma 2.2 and via (2.8)
put βσ = γ
σ
i0
> 0. Now it is easy to see that in these lemma conditions we have
Hi(p1) = Hi(p¯1), i.e., in the right-hand side of (2.9) one can equivalently change
vector pσ by p¯σ for all σ ≥ 1. Now rewrite the inequality from the left hand side of
(2.9) in the form p¯yi− p¯ωi > p¯x¯i− p¯ωi and substitute the following representations:
s∑
σ=1
(p¯yσi − p¯ωσi ) =
s∑
σ=1
p¯σAσzi = q¯zi &
s∑
σ=1
(p¯x¯σi − p¯ωσi ) =
s∑
σ=1
p¯σAσz¯i = q¯z¯i.
This proves the result.
The next theorem presents one of the most meaningful results of this paper. This
theorem states the equivalence between proper-perfect contractual allocations of an
incomplete market and GEI-equilibria.
Theorem 2.1 Let E in be a smooth incomplete market. Then
intX ∩ Dcp(E in) = W (E in) ∩ intX
holds, where Dcp(E in) denotes the set of all proper-perfect contractual allocations and
W (E in) is the set of GEI-equilibrium allocations.
Using the individual rationality property of equilibrium allocations one directly
yields
Corollary 2.3 If E in is a smooth incomplete market, and P i(ωi) ⊂ intXi for all
i ∈ I, then
Dcp(E in) = W (E in),
i.e, an allocation is a GEI-equilibrium if and only if this allocation is proper-perfect
contractual.
Further let us transit to the analysis of the core concept for incomplete markets.
Let us identify, by definition, an allocation from the core of E in with semi-perfect
contractual allocation by Definition 2.3, i.e., put
C(E in) = Dsp(E in).
Below the main properties of C(E in) are investigated and, in particular, it is shown
that under some assumptions, which are not too strong in the context of incomplete
market theory, the set C(E in) fits with the ordinary notion of core as soon as the
market becomes complete.
Consider p1 = (pσ)
σ=s
σ=1, pσ ∈ Rl, σ = 1, . . . , s: some fixed vector of prices in the
spot markets of the future states of the world.
Definition 2.5 An allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X is called p1-feasible if there are
portfolios z = (z1, . . . , zn), zi ∈ Rk,
∑
i∈I zi = 0 such that equalities
pσx
σ
i = pσω
σ
i + pσA
σzi, ∀ i ∈ I, ∀σ = 1, . . . , s
hold.
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The definition of a p1-feasible allocation x ∈ X can be written in an equivalent form:
P1(x
1
i − ω1i ) ∈ L(P1A), i ∈ I, (2.12)
where L(P1A) is the linear hull of the vector-columns of the matrix of returns in
future markets from assets P1A under prices p
1.
Analogously one can define the notion of a p1-feasible allocation for an arbitrary
(nonempty) coalition S ⊂ I, substituting in Definition 2.5 the set I by means of S.
Let us denote by Ap1(S) (or by Ap(S)) the set of all p1-feasible via coalition S
allocations. Note that the set Ap1(S) 6= ∅ for every S ⊂ I since the vector of initial
endowments ωS = (ωi)i∈S always belongs to Ap1(S). Moreover, it has to be clear
from the above definitions that Ap1(I) = H(p1) ∩X.
Definition 2.6 p-core is the set Cp(E in) of all p1-feasible allocations which cannot
be dominated via coalitions, i.e.,
x ∈ Cp(E in) ⇐⇒ x ∈ Ap(I) & 6 ∃S ⊂ I : ∃ y ∈ Ap(S) | yi Âi xi ∀ i ∈ S.
Let agents’ preferences be defined via utility functions, (which are presumed to
be concave and continuous), and let price-vector p1 for future markets be fixed. Then
for an incomplete market one can put into correspondence some cooperative game
with non-transferable utility (to be short, a NTU-game). Recall that formally a
NTU-game (for details, see Moulin (1988), for example) is a couple, (I, (V (S))S⊆I),
described by the set of players (agents) I = {1, . . . , n}, (n ≥ 2) and the sets of
permissible vector-payoffs V (S)⊆RS for every (nonempty) coalition S ⊂ I, which
have to satisfy the following properties:
• V (S) is the nonempty closed subset in RS,
• V (S) is comprehensive from below, i.e., x ∈ V (S) and y ≤ x imply y ∈ V (S),
• the set of all individual-rational vector-payoffs from V (S), is by definition the
set
Q(S) := {v ∈ V (S) | vi ≥ V ({i}) ∀ i ∈ S},
which is nonempty and bounded from above in RS.
In our case the set of all permissible vector-payoffs for coalition S is determined by
formula
Vp(S) =
⋃
x∈Ap(S)
V xp (S),
where
V xp (S) = {(vi)i∈S ≤ (ui(xi))i∈S | (xi)i∈S ∈ Ap(S)}.
Clearly that the sets Vp(S) satisfy all the above described necessary conditions, it
can be checked easily due to the compactness of A(X ) and the continuity of utilities
in the initial incomplete market model.
Recall that the family B of subsets in I is said to be balanced , if for every S ∈ B
there is a real λS ≥ 0, such that∑
S∈B:i∈S
λS = 1 ∀ i ∈ I
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holds or, in an equivalent form, ∑
S∈B
λSeS = eI
takes place where, by definition, eS ∈ RI is such a vector that eiS = 1 for i ∈ S and
eiS = 0 if i /∈ S, i.e, this is the indicator-function of the set S.
A game (I, (V (S))S⊂I) is said to be balanced if for every balanced family of
coalitions B ⋂
S∈B
pr−1|S (V (S)) ⊆ V (I).
Here pr|S(.) is the projection map of space R
I onto RS.
The famous Scarf’s theorem states that the core of a balanced game
(I, (V (S))S⊆I) is nonempty. Applying this theorem and using standard arguments,
one can prove the following
Proposition 2.1 Let A(X ) be a compact and agents’ preferences be defined via
concave continuous utility functions. Then Cp(E in) 6= ∅.
The next lemma presents a convenient tool for the study of an incomplete market
core.
Lemma 2.3 Let E in be a smooth economy and x ∈ intX. Then x ∈ C(E in) if and
only if
(i) x is a partially Pareto optimal allocation, i.e., for every σ ≥ 0 it cannot be
dominated via allocations from Eσx = {y = (yi)I ∈ EI | y−σi = x−σi ∀ i ∈ I},
and
(ii) x ∈ Cp(E in), where (pσ)σ=sσ=1 is a bundle of σ-Pareto prices that corresponds to
item (i).
Note that if in addition Pi(ωi) ⊂ intXi for all i ∈ I is true for the model, then
in the previous lemma the assumption x ∈ intX can be omitted. So in this case this
lemma gives the full description of set C(E in).
In considerations and results immediately below, I always presume incomplete
market E in satisfies the strict monotonicity assumption for every spot market as
follows:
(M) For some i ∈ I and every x ∈ A(X )
({xi}+ E+) \ {xi} ⊂ Pi(xi)5
holds.
Let us call a market (i.e., model E in) complete relative to prices p1 = (pσ)σ=sσ=1 if
the rank of matrix P1A is equal to s, the total number of possible future states of
the world.
5Remember symbol E denotes the commodity space of the economy, where E = Rl(s+1) and
E+ = Rl(s+1)+ .
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A market is complete if it is compete relative to every bundle of spot prices
p1, . . . , ps ∈ Rl such that pσ À 0, σ = 1, . . . , s.
Clearly, this property of completeness (uniform relative to p1 À 0) is a kind of
restriction for matrix A, more exactly for financial markets of assets, the number of
which under this hypothesis has to be not less then s.6 An example of an incomplete
market, satisfying this completeness assumption, is the above described market of
numeraire assets for eσ > 0,
7 σ ≥ 1, in which the matrix R = (rjσ)σ=1,...,s
j=1,...,k
has rank
equal to s.
Slightly strengthening the assumptions of the model, we arrive at the description
of the incomplete market core in familiar terms when the model is compete. This is
stated the following important corollary of Lemma 2.3.
Corollary 2.4 Let E in be a complete smooth economy satisfying (M). Then
intX ∩ C(E in) =
⋃
p1À0
(Cp(E in) ∩ intX)
takes place. If, in addition, E in is such that Pi(ωi) ⊂ intXi for all i ∈ I, then
C(E in) =
⋃
p1À0
Cp(E in).
Proof of Corollary 2.4. Applying Lemma 2.3 on the side of necessity for x ∈ intX ∩
C(E in), due to (i) one can conclude that the allocation x is partially Pareto optimal.
Therefore via assumptions (S) and (M) there exists (and unique) σ-Pareto prices
p¯1 = (p¯σ)
σ=s
σ=1, which satisfy p¯
1 À 0. Now applying item (ii) of Lemma 2.3, we obtain
x ∈ Cp¯(E in) ⊂
⋃
p1À0
Cp(E in).
To prove the inverse inclusion for complete model E in, let us chose any x ∈
Cpˆ(E in) ∩ intX for fixed pˆ1 À 0. Next let us note that due to the completeness of
E in for every p1 À 0 the next system of linear equations
P1xˆ
1
i = P1ω
1
i + P1Azˆi (2.13)
has a solution relative to zˆi and other parameters of any kind. Note that these
solutions satisfy
∑
i∈I zˆi = 0 when (xˆi)i∈I is feasible; in (2.13) instead of P1A, one
can take any square non-singular submatrix whose dimension is s× s. Therefore
every feasible (xˆi)I is p1-feasible for every p1 À 0. Therefore the condition
x ∈ Cpˆ(E in) ∩ intX for pˆ1 À 0 implies that x is Pareto optimal, which entails
its partial Pareto optimality. From this, via (S) and (M), we can conclude the
existence of (unique up to normalization) σ-Pareto prices p¯1 = (p¯σ)
σ=s
σ=1, which also
satisfy p¯1 À 0. Now having in mind the application of Lemma 2.3 in the part of
6Of course this condition cannot be sufficient.
7This is a consumption bundle eσ ∈ Rl chosen as a unit of “numeraire” for assets and for future
spot market σ.
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sufficiency, we have to show only that x ∈ Cp¯(E in). Let y ∈ Ap¯(S) for S ⊂ I.
Once again, using the completeness of the market, we can conclude that system
(2.13) may be solved with respect to zˆi for all i ∈ S when one substitutes yi for xˆi
and after the substitution of p1 by pˆ1. Thus we obtain Ap¯(S) ⊂ Apˆ(S) and, using
x ∈ Cpˆ(E in), may conclude that coalition S cannot dominate allocation x under
prices p¯. Now the application of Lemma 2.3 finishes the proof.
The characterization of an incomplete market core for complete exchange
economies gives the following
Theorem 2.2 Let E in be a smooth economy satisfying (M) such that Pi(ωi) ⊂ intXi
for each i ∈ I. If E in is complete, then C(E in) = C(E).
The asymptotic analog of Theorem 2.1 continues the analysis of the incomplete
core concept. This result is expressed in the form of a replicated incomplete market
that better fits with the classical representation of perfect competition conditions.
The proof of this result is based on the reducing of the problem to the study of
domination via fuzzy coalitions with the succeeding fuzzy core consideration. Of
course the concept of fuzzy core has to be adopted into incomplete markets in a
proper way. In what follows, the problem is reduced to the separation theorem
being applied to separate some convex set from zero (zero cannot belong the set
due to the fuzzy core property). In so doing my analysis is essentially based on the
characteristic Lemma 2.3 and on the fact that rational numbers are dense in the set
of all real ones.
An incomplete market replica of volume r ∈ IN is called the economy E inr , in which
r exact copies of each consumer from initial model E in is put into correspondence in
E inr . The agents from E inr are numbered by double index (i,m), i ∈ I, m = 1, . . . , r,
and it is put Xim = Xi, ωim = ωi. Agents’ preferences are defined and take values in
Xim due to identification Pim = Pi. An assets structure for a replica exactly repeats
the structure of the initial model. To an initial economy E in allocation x = (xi)I ,
we can put into correspondence the replicated economy allocation xr = (xrim) by the
rule xim = xi, ∀ i,m.
Definition 2.7 An allocation x is called a GEI-Edgeworth equilibrium or incom-
plete market Edgeworth equilibrium if xr ∈ C(E inr ) for every natural r = 1, 2, . . .
Ce(E in) denotes the set of all Edgeworth equilibria for model E in.
Next let us consider the most characteristic properties of the Edgeworth equi-
libria. This analysis is convenient to realize under assumptions for which Lemma
2.3 is true. So let E in be a smooth economy and x ∈ intX. Then due to Lemma
2.3, the property x ∈ Ce(E in) is equivalent to the facts that allocation x is partially
Pareto optimal and for partial Pareto prices p1 = (pσ)σ≥1 the allocation belongs to
the p-core of E inr for every natural r. Consider the last requirement in more detail.
It is very important that a domination is admitted via any coalitions and via any
inter-coalition allocation.
Presume that for some r a coalition S⊆I × {1, . . . , r} dominates the allocation
xr. Let I(S)⊆I be the set of all agent types non-trivially presented in the coalition
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S. Due to p-core specification, this domination means that for every (i,m) ∈ S
there is such yim ∈ Pi(xi) that for some zim ∈ Rk and each i ∈ I(S)
P1yim = P1ωi + P1Azim, ∀m : (i,m) ∈ S
holds and in addition ∑
(i,m)∈S
yim =
∑
(i,m)∈S
ωim
takes place. Now if we “average out” the dominating consumption bundles and
portfolios for each given type of agents, i.e., if we put
yi = (
∑
m|(i,m)∈S
yim)/si & zi = (
∑
m|(i,m)∈S
zim)/si ∀ i ∈ I(S),
where si is the number of elements (capacity) in the set S
i = {m | (i,m) ∈ S} (we
have i ∈ I(S) ⇐⇒ Si 6= ∅), then former equalities yield
P1yi = P1ωi + P1Azi &
∑
I(S)
siyi =
∑
I(S)
siωi.
Since Pi(xi) is a convex set, we also obtain yi ∈ Pi(xi) for all i ∈ I(S). Next define
a vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) by putting
ti = si/r, i ∈ I(S) & ti = 0, i ∈ I \ I(S).
Now it has to be clear that in the previous equality natural numbers si can be
equivalently substituted by rational ti. Moreover, under imposed assumptions the
described logical chain can be inverted, i.e., one can show the sufficiency of described
properties for some partially Pareto optimal allocation to be dominated via a coali-
tion in some replica. Resuming the described arguments we are going to a fuzzy
core concept for incomplete markets, which is described below.
Recall that any n-dimension vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) 6= 0, 0 ≤ ti ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ I is
said to be a fuzzy coalition. Let p1 = (pσ)σ≥1 be some fixed bundle of spot prices
for future states of the world. Introduce now the notion of fuzzy p-domination.
A fuzzy coalition t is called p-dominating p1-feasible allocation x ∈ Ap(I), if
there is yt ∈ ∏
i∈I
Xi such that
∑
i∈I
tiy
t
i =
∑
i∈I
tiωi (2.14)
and
ytiÂi xi & ∃ zi ∈ Rk : P1yti1 = P1ω1i + P1Azi ∀ i ∈ supp(t) = {i ∈ I | ti > 0} (2.15)
holds.
Notice that if E in is a smooth economy and allocation x ∈ intX, then the fact
x /∈ Ce(E in) is equivalent to the ability of its p-domination via some fuzzy coalition
with rational components relative to a partial Pareto prices, corresponding to this
allocation.
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Definition 2.8 The set Cfp(E in) of all p1-feasible allocations x ∈ Ap(I), for which
there is no p-dominating fuzzy coalition, is called a fuzzy p-core.
In accordance with this definition the concept of p-fuzzy core differs from ordinary
requirements only in the right-hand side of (2.15), where the potential financial
marketability of consumption bundles relative to the given prices is additionally
required. If, moreover, one requires these prices to be partial Pareto, then one
achieves the notion of incomplete market fuzzy core.
Definition 2.9 The fuzzy core is the set Cf (E in) of all feasible allocations satisfying
the following properties:
(i) x is partial optimal by Pareto, i.e., for every σ ≥ 0 the allocation cannot be
dominated by Pareto via an allocation from subspace
Eσx = {y = (yi)I ∈ EI | y−σi = x−σi , ∀ i ∈ I},
(ii) x ∈ Ap(I), i.e., it is p1-feasible, where p1 = (pσ)σ=sσ=1 is a bundle of σ-Pareto
prices, existing due to item (i),
(iii) x ∈ Cfp(E in), i.e., it belongs to the fuzzy p-core of an incomplete market.
The next lemma states the key properties of a fuzzy p-core.
Lemma 2.4 Let p1 = (pσ)σ≥1 be a bundle of spot prices for future events and x is
a p1-feasible allocation. Let x ∈ Cfp(E in) and xi0 ∈ intXi0 for some i0. Then there
is a vector p¯ = (p¯0, p¯1, . . . , p¯s), such that p¯σ 6= 0 for all σ ≥ 0 and
p¯yi ≥ p¯ωi, ∀ yi ∈ Pi(x¯i) | ∃ zi ∈ Rk : pσ(yσi − ωσi ) = pσAσzi, ∀ σ ≥ 1 (2.16)
is true for all i ∈ I. Moreover, stronger property
p¯yi0 > p¯ωi0 , ∀ yi0 ∈ Pi0(x¯i0) (2.17)
is true for agent i0.
It is useful to compare the statement of this lemma with the statement of Lemma 2.2.
The first difference is that the inequalities in Lemma 2.4 are non-strict. The second
one is that in the right-hand side of the inequalities, the value of initial endowments is
applied. One can find similarities between of these facts with classical market case,
when Pareto optimality is compared with quasiequilibrium. Further notice that
applying the local non-satiation assumption for agents’ preferences in the present
(σ = 0 and (S)) and passing to limits in the left-hand side of inequalities from (2.16),
one can state p¯xi ≥ p¯ωi ∀ i ∈ I, that due to
∑
i∈I xi =
∑
i∈I ωi eventually yields
p¯xi = p¯ωi ∀ i ∈ I.
Finally, let x ∈ intX, the economy is smooth and prices p1 = (pσ)σ≥1 are
partially Pareto optimal. Then the first, non-strict inequalities from the left side of
(2.16) are turned into strict ones. Therefore now the conditions of Lemma 2.2 and
its Corollary 2.2 are true. This is why, due to similar arguments applied in Corollary
2.2 proof, one can state the following
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Corollary 2.5 Let E in be a smooth incomplete market and x¯ ∈ intX ∩ Cf (E in).
Then there is a vector p¯ = (p¯0, p¯1, . . . , p¯s) such that p¯σ 6= 0 for all σ ≥ 0, and for
q¯ =
∑σ=s
σ=1 p¯σAσ and each i ∈ I
p¯0y
0
i > p¯0ω
0
i + q¯zi ∀ yi ∈ Pi(x¯i) | ∃ zi ∈ Rk : p¯σyσi = p¯σωσi + p¯σAσzi ∀σ ≥ 1 (2.18)
is true.
Applying this corollary one can easy prove the asymptotic theorem, which states
that every incomplete market Edgeworth equilibrium is a GEI-equilibrium.
Theorem 2.3 Let E in be a smooth incomplete market. Then
Cf (E in) = Ce(E in) & intX ∩ Ce(E in) = W (E in) ∩ intX.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. First let us show Ce(E in) = Cf (E in). To do it let us state the
inclusion Ce(E in)⊆Cf (E in) (the inverse inclusion is true due to definitions). Assuming
contrary find an allocation x ∈ Ce(E in), which is dominated via a fuzzy coalition
t 6= 0. By definition this means the existence of yt ∈ ∏I Xi, satisfying relations
(2.14) and (2.15). We can show then that the allocation x is dominated via fuzzy
coalition q = (q1, . . . , qn) with rational components qi, i ∈ I. With this in mind for
ti > 0, put
x′i = (ti/qi)yi + (1− ti/qi)ωi =⇒ qi(x′i − ωi) = ti(yi − ωi),
where rational qi satisfies the condition ti ≤ qi ≤ 1, and for ti = 0 define qi = 0 and
x′i = y
t
i . Since ωi ∈ Xi, then x′ = (x′i)I ∈
∏
I Xi and∑
i∈I
qi(x
′
i − ωi) = 0.
However due to (A), the scalars qi can be chosen in such a way that x
′
i ∈ Pi(x) is
true for all i, satisfying qi > 0. Moreover, for these i
∃ z′i ∈ Rk : P1x′i1 = P1ω1i + P1Az′i
holds relative to σ-Pareto prices, corresponding to x, as soon as similar relations are
true for yt (put z′i =
qi
ti
zi). We obtain a contradiction with the choice of x ∈ Ce(E in).
So, the coincidence of a fuzzy core with the set of Edgeworth equilibria has
been proved for an incomplete market. Next let us apply Corollary 2.5 and
using arguments fully equivalent to those described in the second part of The-
orem 2.1, we can state intX∩Cf (E in) = W (E in)∩ intX. Theorem 2.3 is proved.
In finishing this section, let us consider some incomplete market examples and
describe our core concept in their context.
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Example 2.1 (A market with one asset) Let us consider an economic model
with two consumers, two states of the world in the future and no present. Note,
that the last feature (there is no present) is not an essential factor, since formally
the present can always be added to the model description and moreover, to save
the nonsatiation assumption, one can presume that agents are full antagonists in
the present — let agents’ preferences be separable and in the present let them be
defined via linear monotonic and equal utility functions for σ = 0. Also in future
events, σ = 1, 2, there are two commodities and let x = (xσ=1, xσ=2) correspond
to the consumption of the 1st agent, but y = (yσ=1, yσ=2) be the consumption
program for the 2nd one. Let Xi = R4+, i = 1, 2, a total vector of initial endowments
ω = (ωi)i=1,2 ∈ R8+ satisfy ωi À 0 i = 1, 2, and let utilities be described by functions
u1(x) = ρ
1
σ=1U
σ=1
1 (x
σ=1) + ρ1σ=2U
σ=2
1 (x
σ=2),
u2(y) = ρ
2
σ=1U
σ=1
2 (y
σ=1) + ρ2σ=2U
σ=2
2 (y
σ=2),
where for i, σ = 1, 2 real ρiσ > 0, and U
σ
i are (logarithmed) Cobb–Douglas functions:
Uσ1 (z) = ασ ln(z1) + (1− ασ) ln(z2), 0 < ασ < 1,
Uσ2 (z) = βσ ln(z1) + (1− βσ) ln(z2), 0 < βσ < 1.
The analysis of an incomplete market core will be based on key Lemma 2.3, which
for Cobb–Douglas functions gives a complete description of core allocations. Now
to apply item (i) of this lemma, we first need to give the constructive description
of partially Pareto optimal allocations. As soon as utilities are separable relative
to events, the σ-Pareto optimality of allocation (x, y) is completely determined by
consumption bundles (xσ, yσ) for this event (in the general case it may depend on
consumption at other events), i.e., by functions Uσ1 (.), U
σ
2 (.) and via total initial
endowments ω¯σ = ωσ1 + ω
σ
2 . In other words, when utilities are separable, the set of
partially Pareto optimal allocations may be represented as the Cart’s product (by
σ) of Pareto boundaries which correspond to spot markets. Therefore we first have
to describe the Pareto boundary for a model reduced to σ.
Let us calculate in general form the Pareto boundary for a classical economy with
Cobb–Douglas utility functions. Let there be two goods and two consumers, where
as above x denotes the 1st agent consumption and y is the consumption of 2nd one.
Due to individual rationality we are interested in allocations from the interior of
consumption sets, i.e., (x, y)À 0. In such a case, for each Pareto optimal allocation
one can put into correspondence (non-zero) price vector p, which has to be collinear
to the gradients of the utility functions. This vector can be found unambiguously
up to normalization; this is why the existence conditions of p = (p1, p2) À 0 and
λ > 0 such that
p = gradU1 = (
α
x1
, 1−α
x2
) ⇐⇒ x = ( α
p1
, 1−α
p2
) & 〈p, x〉 = 1,
p = λgradU2 = λ(
β
y1
, 1−β
y2
) ⇐⇒ y = λ( β
p1
, 1−β
p2
) & 〈p, y〉 = λ,
are necessary and sufficient for allocation (x, y) to be Pareto optimal. Taking into
account x+ y = ω¯ = (ω¯1, ω¯2), from the right-hand side of last relations one can find
( α
p1
, 1−α
p2
) + λ( β
p1
, 1−β
p2
) = ω¯ =⇒ p = ( α
ω¯1
, 1−α
ω¯2
) + λ( β
ω¯1
, 1−β
ω¯2
).
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Thus real λ > 0 parameterizes the Pareto boundary unambiguously (since x, y can
be unambiguously found by p and λ). Moreover, it is clear that this analysis can be
easily extended to a more general case, that is, for any (finite) number of goods and
consumers. Notice only that then the number of (positive) parameters determining
Pareto boundary is equal to the number of agents minus one.
Further let us turn to an incomplete economy and initially consider the case of
a unique real asset. Let, for example, this asset a have the form
a = (aσ=1, aσ=2), aσ=1 = −aσ=2 = (1, 0).
Then for given spot prices, financial returns matrix P1A for trade portfolios has the
form
P1A =
(
p1σ=1
−p1σ=2
)
.
Now let us turn to item (ii) from Lemma 2.3, which requires a current partial Pareto
optimal allocation (x, y) to be p1-feasible and to belong to the p-core of the economy
for partially Pareto prices p corresponding to this allocation.
To simplify further our analysis, let us assume without loss of generality that
the total endowment of each commodity in every state of world is equal to 1, i.e.,
we put ω¯σ=1 = ω¯σ=2 = (1, 1). Then partial Pareto optimality for prices means that
for some λ > 0 and γ > 0 we have
pσ=1 =
(
ασ=1
ω¯1σ=1
, 1−ασ=1
ω¯2σ=1
)
+ λ
(
βσ=1
ω¯1σ=1
, 1−βσ=1
ω¯2σ=1
)
ω¯σ=(1,1)⇐⇒
pσ=1 = (α1 + λβ1, 1− α1 + λ(1− β1)), (2.19)
pσ=2 =
(
ασ=2
ω¯1σ=2
, 1−ασ=2
ω¯2σ=2
)
+ γ
(
βσ=2
ω¯1σ=2
, 1−βσ=2
ω¯2σ=2
)
ω¯σ=(1,1)⇐⇒
pσ=2 = (α2 + γβ2, 1− α2 + γ(1− β2)). (2.20)
The condition of p1-feasibility states that there is such real z that P1x = P1ω1 + P1Az
that via the structure of P1A yields
pσ=1x
σ=1 = pσ=1ω
σ=1
1 + p
1
σ=1z, pσ=2x
σ=2 = pσ=2ω
σ=2
1 − p1σ=2z.
This, due to pσx
σ = 1, is equivalent to
p1σ=2 + p
1
σ=1 = p
1
σ=2〈pσ=1, ωσ=11 〉+ p1σ=1〈pσ=2, ωσ=21 〉.
Now applying (2.19), (2.20), we find
α2 + γβ2 + α1 + λβ1 =
= (α2 + γβ2)〈(α1 + λβ1), 1− α1 + λ(1− β1)), ωσ=11 〉+
+(α1 + λβ1)〈(α2 + γβ2, 1− α2 + γ(1− β2)), ωσ=21 〉. (2.21)
Thus an allocation (x, y) is p1-feasible if and only if, when determining parameters,
λ > 0, γ > 0 satisfy equation (2.21).
Next let us study the property of an allocation (x, y) being dominated by no
coalition. Since the list of coalitions contains only singleton and grand coalitions,
then this property is equivalent to
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(i) u1(x) ≥ u1(ω1) & u2(y) ≥ u2(ω2),
(ii) the allocation (x, y) is ParetoH(p1)-optimal relative to partial Pareto prices p1.
Condition (ii) requires subsequent analysis. To do this apply Corollary 2.1. In our
context Corollary 2.1 states that an allocation is H-optimal iff there is such µ > 0
that vector p˜ = grad u2(y)− µp satisfies
p˜σ=1aσ=1 + p˜σ=2aσ=2 = 0 =⇒ p˜1σ=1 − p˜1σ=2 = 0,
that due to the relationship between grad u2(y) and p gives
(
1
λ
− µ)p1σ=1 − (
1
γ
− µ)p1σ=2 = 0 ⇐⇒ µ(p1σ=2 − p1σ=1) =
1
γ
p1σ=2 −
1
λ
p1σ=1.
The last relation is disintegrated into the following variants:
a) p1σ=2 = p
1
σ=1 =⇒ λ = γ,
b) p1σ=2 > p
1
σ=1 =⇒ λp1σ=2 > γp1σ=1,
c) p1σ=2 < p
1
σ=1 =⇒ λp1σ=2 < γp1σ=1.
So, taking into account relations (2.19) and (2.20), an allocation is H-optimal iff
one of the below relations
α2 + γβ2 = α1 + λβ1 & λ = γ, (2.22)
α2 + γβ2 > α1 + λβ1 & λ(α2 + γβ2) > γ(α1 + λβ1), (2.23)
α2 + γβ2 < α1 + λβ1 & λ(α2 + γβ2) < γ(α1 + λβ1) (2.24)
is true.
Let us resume our given analysis. We supposed without loss of generality that
ω¯σ=1 = ω¯σ=2 = (1, 1). The allocations from the core are unambiguously determined
via real parameters λ > 0, γ > 0, which have to satisfy (2.21) and one of the
relations (2.22)–(2.24). Then the first agent’s consumption is determined due to
xσ=1 =
(
α1
p1σ=1
,
1− α1
p2σ=1
)
, xσ=2 =
(
α2
p1σ=2
,
1− α2
p2σ=2
)
,
where pσ=1 and pσ=2 are determined by λ, γ due to formulas (2.19), (2.20), and then
the 2nd agent’s consumption y is
y = (1, 1, 1, 1)− x.
Moreover, the following relations
u1(x) ≥ u1(ω1) & u2(y) ≥ u2(ω2)
have to be true too. These requirements are not conflicting, since the equilibrium
allocation, which does exist, satisfies all of them. In the general case, a core is
represented as an image of all determining parameters, obtained as the intersection
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of some hyperbola defined by (2.21) and a set defined as the union of three sets,
defined by (2.22)–(2.24). The properties of individual rationality of allocation have
to be fulfilled in addition.
In conclusion let me say some words about the set that is determined via relations
(2.22)–(2.24). It is clear that (2.22) can be true only for special parameters ασ,
βσ, σ = 1, 2 (either both α1 − α2 and β1 − β2 are not zero simultaneously and
have different signs, or α1 = α2 and β1 = β2 simultaneously), and in the general
case, defines the empty or a singleton set. Constraints (2.23) and (2.24) are more
involved. In fact, consider a straight line α2 + γβ2 = α1 + λβ1 and hyperbola
λ(α2 + γβ2) = γ(α1 + λβ1). The line intersects the positive orthant by some ray
with a positive directing vector and separates the plane into two open half-planes, a
left and right one. The hyperbola has asymptotes paralleled to coordinate aces which
are intersected at point (λ0, γ0) = (
α1
β2−β1 ,
−α2
β2−β1 ). Since (0, 0) satisfies the hyperbola
equation, then a path going across this point, and only this path intersects the
orthant. Moreover, note that the point of intersection of hyperbola and the line
exactly corresponds to condition (2.22) (for (λ, γ) À 0). Next, let for example
β2 − β1 > 0. Then the set determined by relation (2.23) can be described as the
intersection of an open epigraph left hyperbola path with the left upper half-plane,
defined by our line. Relation (2.24) is true at the points of the interior of a set, which
supplements the epigraph of the left hyperbola path up to the positive orthant, being
intersected with the right lower half-plane. The union of these two sets with the
point of intersection of hyperbola and line completely describes the collection of
all points (λ, γ) À 0, satisfying conditions (2.22)–(2.24). The case β2 − β1 < 0
is considered in a similar way. However now the point of hyperbola asymptotes
intersection has a negative first component and only the right path of the hyperbola
intersects the orthant’s interior (it goes across the origin). This is why the set we are
interested in is represented as a union of three sets. The fist one is the intersection of
the right open half-plane, defined due to a line with a part of the orthant’s interior
restricted by the right hyperbola path (a part of epigraph). The second one is the
intersection of the left open half-plane with a part of the orthant’s interior, from
which one has to remove the subgraph of the right hyperbola path. Finally, one
needs to add the point of hyperbola intersection with the line if it does exist.
Further let us consider a more complex incomplete market example, in which
utilities are described in the same manner as in Example 2.1; however, there are
two real assets. The particular case of this market is known in literature as Hart’s
example, in which GEI-equilibrium may not exist.
Example 2.2 (Hart’s example) In the context of the economy described in Ex-
ample 2.1, let us consider a financial market with two assets having the following
structure. Let
a1 = (a1σ=1, a
1
σ=2), a
1
σ=1 = a
1
σ=2 = (1, 0)
be the first asset and let
a2 = (a2σ=1, a
2
σ=2), a
2
σ=1 = a
2
σ=2 = (0, 1)
be the second one. Thus the buying of the 1st asset unit promises the delivery of
a unit of commodity 1 for the future (at every event). Analogous delivery of the
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second asset is a unit of the 2nd commodity for every future event. As a whole the
matrix A of real returns has the form
A =

1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
 = Aσ=1
= Aσ=2
From this one can find the matrix of financial returns P1A for the trade portfolios
of the financial sector relative to given prices p1 for spot markets:
P1A =
 pσ=1
(
1
0
)
pσ=1
(
0
1
)
pσ=2
(
1
0
)
pσ=2
(
0
1
)
 = [ p1σ=1 p2σ=1p1σ=2 p2σ=2
]
=
[
pσ=1
pσ=2
]
.
Similar to Example 2.1, the analysis of the core is based on Lemma 2.3. Due to
item (i) of this lemma, a partial Pareto prices p1 = (pσ)σ=1,2 may be put into
correspondence to every core allocation (unambiguously). Now in view of Example
2.1 analysis for some partially Pareto prices, conveniently normed by (2.19) and
(2.20) (here ω¯σ=1 = ω¯σ=2 = (1, 1) without loss of generality), we obtain
P1A =
[
α1 + λβ1 1− α1 + λ(1− β1)
α2 + γβ2 1− α2 + γ(1− β2)
]
,
where λ > 0 and γ > 0 are some real parameters, which unambiguously determine
the partial Pareto boundary. Due to item (ii) of Lemma 2.3 in order to current
partially Pareto optimal allocation to be an element of the core it is also necessary
(and sufficient) that the allocation be p1-feasible and be an element of p-core for
its partial Pareto prices p1. The condition of p1-feasibility says that there is such
vector z = (z1, z2), that P1x = P1ω1 + P1Az. This, for the chosen normalization of
prices (it implies pσ=1xσ=1 = pσ=2xσ=2 = 1), is equivalent to the system of linear
equations
P1Az =
(
1
1
)
− P1ω1, (2.25)
which has a solution relative to z. First note that if square matrix P1A is non-
degenerated, then a solution of system (2.25) does exist for every right-hand side,
and therefore for a given one. On the contrary, if the matrix columns are linear
dependent (degeneration), then a solution of the system may exist only if there is a
solution for the system with only one unknown variable, where instead of matrix P1A
one can take a matrix consisting of one (any) column of the initial matrix with the
same right-hand side. In other words, if the matrix is degenerated, then we obtain
a model with the only asset. Thus for non-degenerated matrix P1A, the condition
of p1-feasibility is true automatically, for the degenerated one it is not the case and
it turns to be a non-trivial condition. A matrix P1A is degenerated if and only if its
determinant is zero, i.e., det(P1A) = 0 ⇐⇒
(α1 + λβ1)(1− α2 + γ(1− β2)) = (α2 + γβ2)(1− α1 + λ(1− β1)). (2.26)
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In view of (2.25) the condition of p1-feasibility takes place only if for some real z
1 = pσ=1ω
σ=1
1 + p
1
σ=1z, 1 = pσ=2ω
σ=2
1 + p
1
σ=2z
is true, which is equivalent to
p1σ=2 − p1σ=1 = p1σ=2〈pσ=1, ωσ=11 〉 − p1σ=1〈pσ=2, ωσ=21 〉.
Now applying (2.19) and (2.20), this equation may be standardly rewritten as an
equation relative to λ > 0 and γ > 0, similar to (2.21), which I omitted. It is
important that this relation has to be fulfilled together with (2.26). Moreover, due
to the fact that the allocation has to belong to the p-core, it is necessary to require
the following relations to be true:
(i) u1(x) ≥ u1(ω1) & u2(y) ≥ u2(ω2),
(ii) allocation (x, y) is Pareto H(p1)-optimal for partial Pareto prices p1.
The analysis of matrix P1A shows that condition (ii) is always true since it is reduced
to the existence of µ > 0, which satisfies relation µ(p1σ=2 + p
1
σ=1) =
1
γ
p1σ=2 +
1
λ
p1σ=1.
Therefore only p1-feasibility and individual rationality (i) conditions are essential.
Now let us turn to the case when (2.26) is false, i.e., thematrix of financial returns
for partial Pareto prices is non-degenerated . In this case an allocation belongs to
the incomplete core only if it belongs to the classical core, i.e., requirements (i)
and (ii) are true, where (ii) is transformed into ordinary optimality by Pareto. The
last requirement can be expressed in a standard way as the requirement of utilities’
gradients to be collinear: due to their relationship with the partial Pareto prices
relative to chosen normalization,
gradu1(x) = (ρ
1
σ=1pσ=1, ρ
1
σ=2pσ=2) & grad u2(y) = (
ρ2σ=1
λ
pσ=1,
ρ2σ=2
γ
pσ=2)
yields
λρ1σ=1/ρ
2
σ=1 = γρ
1
σ=2/ρ
2
σ=2 ⇐⇒ λ = γ
ρ2σ=1ρ
1
σ=2
ρ1σ=1ρ
2
σ=2
. (2.27)
Thus if parameters λ > 0, γ > 0 satisfy the last relation and simultaneously do not
satisfy (2.26), the corresponding allocation belongs to the incomplete core.
Further let us consider properly Hart’s example, which corresponds to our model
with two assets under an additional condition:
ρ1σ = ρ
2
σ = ρσ, σ = 1, 2 & ασ=1 = ασ=2 = α, βσ=1 = βσ=2 = β.
The left hand side of this requirement and (2.27) implies λ = γ, i.e., an allocation is
optimal by Pareto iff λ = γ. Initial endowments for Hart’s example are determined
as
ωσ=11 = (1− ε, 1− ε), ωσ=21 = (ε, ε), ωσ1 + ωσ2 = (1, 1), σ = 1, 2,
where real 0 < ε < 1.
Let us show that for Hart’s example the set of allocations from the incomplete
core, which corresponds to the non-degenerated matrix of financial returns, forms
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the empty set. In fact if (x, y) ∈ C(E in) and det(P1A) 6= 0, then (x, y) is Pareto
optimal and λ = γ. However then from ασ = α, βσ = β, σ = 1, 2 one can conclude
the coincidence of matrix P1A rows and therefore det(P1A) = 0 — contradiction.
Next consider the second possibility: (x, y) ∈ C(E in) and det(P1A) = 0. It may
be realized only if system (2.25) is solvable. The last one for this case is equivalent
to the solvability of system(
α + λβ
α + γβ
)
z =
(
1
1
)
−
(
(α + λβ, 1− α+ λ(1− β))ωσ=11
(α + γβ, 1− α+ γ(1− β))ωσ=21
)
;
substituting for the value of initial endowments, and realizing some elementary trans-
formations we find(
α + λβ
α+ γβ
)
z =
(
1
1
)
−
(
(1− ε)(1 + λ)
ε(1 + γ)
)
. (2.28)
Next, substituting ασ = α, βσ = β, σ = 1, 2 in (2.26) and doing transformations,
we obtain
det(P1A) = 0 ⇐⇒ (γ − λ)(α− β) = 0.
Thus the matrix of financial returns is degenerated only if γ = λ (as seen above) or
when α = β. In the first case (2.28) may be fulfilled only if ε = 1/2. In the second
case, (2.28) is reduced to
α
(
1 + λ
1 + γ
)
z =
(
1
1
)
−
(
(1− ε)(1 + λ)
ε(1 + γ)
)
=
(
λ(ε− 1) + ε
1 + ε+ εγ
)
.
This system is solvable only if
λ(ε− 1) + ε
1 + ε+ εγ
=
1 + λ
1 + γ
⇐⇒ 1 + 2λ+ λγ = 0.
However, the last equation cannot be solved for λ > 0 and γ > 0.
Let us resume our analysis. For Hart’s example the core of an incomplete market
is a non-empty set only for ε = 1/2, and for this case the incomplete core coincides
with the classical market core (since then the solvability of (2.28) is equivalent to an
allocation is Pareto optimal). For ε 6= 1/2, the core is empty, which can be explained
via the specific features of given model parameters: preferences and real assets. This
peculiarity is such that contracting each other at every nature event and applying
real assets (in a given structure) in the present, the agents are not able to arrive
at Pareto optimal allocation, regardless of the fact that there is potentially enough
assets (so much as there are many future states of the world). In other words any
feasible net of contracts is unstable in the sense that coalition {1, 2} of all market
operators is able to find an opportunity to sign a new exchange contract, taking into
account the ability to break some of the given contracts (remember that for future
events one can break virtual contracts). Figure 2.2 illustrates the case. In this
figure the abilities V (1, 2) = u[A(X )] of coalition {1, 2} are described in the criterial
space of “utilities” in a standard manner. The abilities of singleton coalitions are
presented via vector u(ω) = (u1(ω1), u2(ω2)). Curve AB, representing a part of the
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Figure 2.2: Classical and incomplete core in Hart’s example
Pareto boundary, corresponds to the standard core of the market. For an incomplete
market the points of this curve are not available for consumers since a bundle of
utilities from the curve is realized via an allocation which is not p1-feasible. Notice
that one can infinitesimally closely approach the points of this curve via allocations
which are partially Pareto optimal and p1-feasible relative to partial Pareto prices.
In fact, partial Pareto boundary is completely parameterized by couples (λ, γ)À 0,
and in doing so a point belongs to the (classical) Pareto boundary only if λ = γ.
Moreover, the matrix of financial returns is also degenerated only if λ = γ (let for
simplicity α 6= β). Thus for every point (λ, γ) À 0, λ 6= γ a partially optimal
and simultaneously p1-feasible allocation may be put into correspondence, which for
λ/γ being near enough to 1 realizes a utility vector, which is close enough to the
Pareto optimal one. In this economy Pareto optimal allocations may be attained
only in a limit , and a sequence of contracts , reflecting the exchange of assets in
the p1-feasibility condition in this passing to a limit, which is an unbounded one.
The last observation is rather important, and I are going to discuss it more detailed
below.
A contract of this kind for some (λ, γ)À 0, λ 6= γ can be calculated as a solution
of system (2.25), that for det(P1A) 6= 0 (true for λ 6= γ) yields
z = [P1A]
−1
[(
1
1
)
− P1ω1
]
.
However for γ → λ we have det(P1A) → 0 and, since det([P1A]−1) = 1/ det(P1A),
then det([P1A]
−1) → ∞. Therefore, ||[P1A]−1|| (the norm of operator [P1A]−1, con-
sidered as a function of parameters λ, γ), is unbounded for γ → λ > 0. Moreover,
one can show that exactly for the vectors of form yλγ = (1, 1)−P1ω1 (prices depend
on λ, γ), operator [P1A]
−1 values are norm-unbounded for γ → λ > 0. It seems to be
true that exactly this fact is the main cause of the potential non-stability of finan-
cial market. Speaking substantially in terms of contracts, one may see that during
the contracting and recontracting process, market operators may realize “a race to
infinity”, i.e., the total volume of contracts for one of the agents may rise with no
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limit. The problem can be solved if one imposes some constraints on the total vol-
ume of contracts from the asset market for each agent; it is enough to restrict only
the volumes of sales or purchase, but with the same style for all agents. Notice that
choosing some finite but big enough constraints, one can realize allocations that are
near enough to the allocations (or to the utilities bundles) of a classical core.
2.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. The first part of item (i) Lemma 2.1 is obvious. To check
the second part, recall that for every contractual x = (xi)i∈I , xi = (x0i , . . . , x
s
i ),
the representation (2.2) or equivalent relation(2.3) takes place. Further, as soon
as (x¯σi )i∈I is an equilibrium allocation for reduced onto σ = 1, . . . , s economy Eσ
equipped with endowments (ωσi +Aσ∆zi(W )) (it was noted above and follows from
Theorem 1.2), then
pσx¯
σ
i = pσω
σ
i + pσAσ∆zi, (2.29)
and x¯i ∈ Hi for all i. Moreover, the equilibrium properties of x¯σ and Theorem 1.2
imply pσv
σ
i = 0, v
σ ∈ V σ for all i and σ ≥ 1. Now if one breaks a part of contract
vσ ∈ V σ, then the new allocation (xˆσi )i∈I satisfies the system (2.29). Therefore
xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn) ∈ H. Note that breaking of a share of contracts in the present
touches the exchanges of assets and the agents just realize the new allocation, for
which the condition to be in H is realized for a new ∆z˜i. The last one ends with
the checking of (i).
To see that statement (ii) is true, let us presume that some semi-perfect contrac-
tual x is Pareto-dominated by allocation y ∈ H. Now since x, y ∈ H, then there are
such z, z′, that the following equalities are true:
pσx
σ
i − pσωσi = pσAσzi, σ = 1, . . . , s, i ∈ I,
pσy
σ
i − pσωσi = pσAσz′i, σ = 1, . . . , s, i ∈ I.
As soon as all contracts from V σ, σ ≥ 1 in the web V = s∪
σ=1
V σ ∪W , which realizes
x = x(V ), are perfect, due to perfect contract definition one may change contracts
related to the future states of the world and realize xσ by the (proper) web, which
consists of two contracts — v′σ and v′′σ, defined by formulas:
v′σi = y
σ
i − ωσi − Aσz′i, i ∈ I,
v′′σi = x
σ
i − yσi − Aσ(zi − z′i), i ∈ I,
for all σ = 1, . . . , s, and saving in the present “old” contracts. This is a web due
to the fact that the consumption sets are rectangular. Now due to Proposition 1.1
and its corollaries, to check the properness of v′σ and v′′σ it is enough to verify that
v′i
σpσ = 0 and v
′′
i
σpσ = 0 for all i, which we already have. In view of Definition 2.3,
the new web of contracts has to be stable relative to the simultaneous procedure
of contracts breaking and signing a new contract in the “present.” Now one can
break (as a whole) the contracts of the second type and all contracts in the present
and sign the new contract wˆ0 = (y0 − ω0, z′) for σ = 0. In so doing the agents
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can realize allocation y, which contradicts the definition of semi-perfect (first) and
proper-perfect (second) contractual allocations.
Item (iii) follows from the definition of semi-perfect contractual allocation and
from Theorem 1.2.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Let us write in matrix form the conditions, that define the
allocations from H. In fact for feasible x ∈ H, there are zi ∈ Rk, i ∈ I such that
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
ωi;
n∑
i=1
zi = 0;
pσx
σ
i − pσAσzi = pσωσi , σ = 1, . . . , s
holds. Notice that if balance relations and budget constraints pσx
σ
i −pσAσzi = pσωσi
are satisfied for some fixed σ ≥ 1 and all i ∈ I \{i0}, then the last budget constraint
is also true automatically. This is why all agent i0’s budget constraints, being linear
dependent, may be removed from the system of linear equations defining the space
H. One may think without loss of generality that i0 = n. Denote by B the matrix
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
El 0 . . . 0 . El 0 . . . 0 El 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 El . 0 · · · 0 El . 0 0 El . 0 0 . . . 0 0
... . . . .
... . . . . . .
...
...
...
...
0 0 . El . 0 0 . El 0 0 . El 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 Ek . . . Ek Ek
0 p1 . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 −p1A1 . 0 0
..
. . . . .
..
.
..
. .
..
.
..
.
..
. .
..
.
..
. .
..
.
..
.
0 0 . ps . 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 −psAs . 0 0
..
.
..
. . . .
..
. . .
..
.
..
.
..
. .
..
. . . .
..
.
0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 p1 . 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 . −p1A1 0
..
.
..
. .
..
. .
..
. . . .
..
.
..
. .
..
.
..
. .
..
.
..
.
0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . ps 0 0 . . . 0 0 . −psAs 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Here in standard manner El and Ek denote the unit matrices of an appropriate size
and p1, ps, p1A1 and psAs are row-vectors. Clearly we have the following equivalence:
feasible x ∈ H ⇐⇒ there exists z = (z1, . . . , zn) such that
B ∗

x01
...
xs1
...
x0n
...
xsn
z1
...
zn

=

ω¯0
...
ω¯s
0k
p1ω
1
1
...
psω
s
1
...
p1ω
1
n−1
...
psω
s
n−1

.
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Further let us consider the subspace
HZ = {((x1, z1), ., (xn, zn)) ∈ (Rl(s+1) × Rk)I | B(x1, . . . , xn, z1, . . . , zn) = 0};
this is the kernel of operator B(.), in which the order of components is changed
for the convenience of the below considerations. Due to Lemma 2.1, the allocation
x¯ ∈ H and is Pareto-optimal relative to H. Therefore∏
I
[(Pi(x¯i)− x¯i)× Rk] ∩HZ = ∅
takes place (note that via the second part of (A) each of these sets is
nonempty). Now by the separation theorem we may find such linear functional
f = (f1, . . . , fn) 6= 0, fi = (fxi , f zi ) ∈ Rl(s+1)+k that
〈f,
∏
I
[(Pi(x¯)− x¯i)× Rk]〉 ≥ 〈f,HZ〉
holds. Notice the functional f is constant (and hence is equal to zero) onto subspace
HZ , since the right-hand side of the last inequality is bounded. Therefore
〈f,
∏
I
[(Pi(x¯)− x¯i)× Rk]〉 ≥ 0 (2.30)
is true. Let us show further that f zi = 0, i ∈ I, i.e.,
fi = (f
0
i , . . . , f
s
i , 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
)
holds for every i ∈ I. In fact, consider fixed xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆI), xˆi ∈ (Pi(x¯) − x¯i),
i ∈ I, uˆj ∈ Rk, j 6= i0 for some i0 ∈ I. In view of (2.30), for any u ∈ Rk we have∑
j 6=i0
〈fj, (xˆj, uˆj)〉+ 〈fi0 , (xˆi0 , u)〉 ≥ 0,
which is possible only if f zi0 = 0 and in view of the arbitrariness of i0, for all i0 ∈ I.
For the convenience of the below notations I will identify the functional fi with f
x
i ,
i.e., by convention let us put fi = (f
x
i , 0) = (fi, 0).
Let us show further that
〈fi, (Pi(x¯)− x¯i)〉 ≥ 0, i ∈ I, (2.31)
and moreover, if fi 6= 0 and x¯i ∈ intXi, then the inequality is strict. Presuming the
contrary one can find consumer j0 such that
〈fj0 , (yj0 − x¯j0)〉 = −ε
for some ε > 0, yj0 ∈ Pj0(x¯). Now due to the local-nonsatiation of preferences, we
can conclude
∀ i 6= j0 ∀ δ > 0 ∃ yi ∈ Pi(x¯) : ‖ yi − x¯i ‖≤ δ.
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Now placing vector y = (y1, . . . , yn) in (2.30), we obtain
〈f, (y − x¯)〉 =
∑
i6=j0
〈fi, (yi − x¯i)〉 − ε ≤ δ
∑
i6=j0
‖ fi ‖ −ε.
However we have
∑
i6=j0 ‖ fi ‖6= 0 (otherwise (2.30) is false) and may choose
δ < ε/
∑
i6=j0 ‖ fi ‖, and find 〈f, (y− x¯)〉 < 0, which contradicts (2.30). Thus (2.31)
is true in the non-strict form of inequalities. Now assumption x¯ ∈ intX and (A) for
fi 6= 0 standardly imply the strictness of these inequalities.
Further, the fact that functional f = (f1, . . . , fn) is constant onto subspace
HZ implies that this functional can be represented as a linear combination of the
vector-rows of matrix B. Now using the structure of matrix B, one can conclude
the existence of such real λσi , σ ≥ 1 i ∈ I, i 6= n and such vectors q ∈ Rk, p¯ =
(p¯0, . . . , p¯s) ∈ E ′, that for all i 6= n the following system of linear equations is true:
f 0i = p¯0,
fσi = p¯σ + λ
σ
i pσ, σ ≥ 1,
f zi = 0 = −q +
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσAσ,
(2.32)
and for i = n we have f zn = 0 = −q + 0 and fxn = p¯. Putting λσn = 0 for all σ ≥ 1,
one may think (2.32) is true for all i ∈ I. Moreover system (2.32) implies that
q =
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσAσ = 0 for all i. Note also that assumption p¯0 = 0 contradicts (S), the
local-nonsatiation in each spot market (and therefore for σ = 08). Therefore fi 6= 0
and on the right-hand side of (2.31) we have a strict inequality for all i. Moreover
as soon as fn = p¯ 6= 0, due to the same arguments — from the local-nonsatiation
agent n in each future spot market — we conclude that p¯σ 6= 0 for all i and σ. It is
also clear that due to (2.31) and (S), we have fσi 6= 0 for all i and σ.
Now let us show that p¯ satisfies the other requirements of Lemma 2.2. Having
this in mind, first note that by subspaces Hi specification for every xi ∈ Hi we have
pσ(x
σ
i − ωσi ) = pσAσzi, σ = 1, . . . , s
for some zi ∈ Rk. Now multiplying equalities on λσi and then summing them by
σ = 1, . . . , s, one obtains
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσ(x
σ
i − ωσi ) =
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσAσzi = (
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσAσ)zi = qzi. (2.33)
Next let us recall that due to (2.31) and the above considerations we also have
〈fi, (Pi(x¯)− x¯i)〉 > 0 =⇒ 〈fi, (yi − x¯i)〉 > 0 ∀ yi ∈ Pi(x¯) ∩Hi 6= ∅ (2.34)
for all i ∈ I. Now substituting the representation of fi from (2.32), we obtain
p¯0(y
0
i − x¯0i ) +
s∑
σ=1
〈(p¯σ + λσi pσ), (yσi − x¯σi )〉 > 0 ∀ yi ∈ Pi(x¯) ∩Hi.
8Since due to Hi specification, if yi ∈ Hi then for y¯i = (y¯σi )σ=sσ=0, where y¯σi = yσi for σ ≥ 1, we
have y¯i ∈ Hi for every y¯0i , and therefore Pi(x¯) ∩Hi 6= ∅ for all i.
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Subtracting from the left and right-hand sides of the inequality the value
s∑
σ=1
λσi (pσω
σ
i ), after transformations we obtain
p¯0y
0
i +
s∑
σ=1
p¯σy
σ
i +
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσ(y
σ
i − ωσi ) > p¯0x¯0i +
s∑
σ=1
p¯σx¯
σ
i +
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσ(x¯
σ
i − ωσi ).
Since x¯i, yi ∈ Hi, there are such z¯i = z¯i(x¯i) zi = zi(yi) that relations (2.33) are true.
Now due to the previous inequality we get
〈p¯, yi〉+ qzi > 〈p¯, x¯i〉+ qz¯i.
However from the last equation of (2.32) we have q = f zn = 0, which gives
〈p¯, yi〉 > 〈p¯, x¯i〉 ∀ yi ∈ Pi(x¯) ∩Hi ⇐⇒ 〈p¯, ((Pi(x¯) ∩Hi)− x¯i)〉 > 0. (2.35)
The sufficiency of relations (2.9) and (2.10) for an allocation x¯ ∈ A(X )∩H(p1) to
be Pareto H(p1)-optimal is stated quite standardly. In fact let there be y = (yi)I ∈
A(X )∩H(p1) such that yi Âi x¯i is true for all i. Then as soon as the right-hand side
in (2.9) is fulfilled for y = (yi)I ∈ H(p1) due to H(p1) determination, via the left-
hand part of (2.9), we can conclude p¯yi > p¯x¯i for all i. Now, summing inequalities
over i one finds p¯
∑
i∈I yi > p¯
∑
i∈I x¯i. Since
∑
i∈I yi =
∑
i∈I x¯i =
∑
i∈I ωi, we are
coming to a contradiction. Lemma 2.2 is proved.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. We have to consider the smooth case in the context of Lemma
2.2. On the necessary side, for the existence of values αi > 0 and λ
σ
i ∀σ ≥ 1, one
can state it directly from relations (2.9) and (2.10), applying separation theorem (or
simply from the necessary conditions of the convex programming problem). However
the easiest way to see it may be found from condition x¯ ∈ intX and relations (2.31),
stated in the proof of Lemma 2.2. From this we conclude in a standard way the
existence of such αi > 0, that grad ui(x¯i) = αifi (αi 6= 0 due to fi 6= 0 and
gradui(x¯i) 6= 0). Finally one needs to apply (2.32).
To state the sufficiency, let us show that relations (2.9) and (2.10) are true. For
some i and yi ∈ Pi(x¯i), assume ∃ zi ∈ Rk : pσ(yσi − ωσi ) = pσAσzi ∀σ ≥ 1. Due to
gradient’s properties for interior points we have
〈gradui(x¯i), yi〉 > 〈gradui(x¯i), x¯i〉 ∀ i ∈ I.
Now substituting the gradient presentation given in the corollary conditions, one
can conclude
αip¯yi +
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσy
σ
i > αip¯x¯i +
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσx¯
σ
i .
However there are zi, z¯i ∈ Rk, such that pσyσi = pσωσi + pσAσzi &
pσx¯
σ
i = pσω
σ
i + pσAσz¯i ∀σ ≥ 1. Substituting these expressions in the former for-
mula, one can find
αip¯yi +
s∑
σ=1
pσω
σ
i + (
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσAσ)zi > αip¯x¯i +
s∑
σ=1
pσω
σ
i + (
s∑
σ=1
λσi pσAσ)z¯i,
Proofs 73
that due to
∑s
σ=1 λ
σ
i pσAσ = 0 and αi > 0 gives the result.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. To check the inclusion
W (E in) ∩ intX ⊂ intX ∩ Dcp(E in),
take some x ∈ W (E in) ∩ intX and consider the web V = {vσ}σ=sσ=0, where
v0 = (x0 − ω0, z), vσ = (xσ − ωσ − Aσz), σ = 1, . . . , s
and by convention Aσz = (Aσzi)i∈I for the appropriate portfolios zi existing due
to the GEI-definition. Due to Theorem 1.2 and the GEI-equilibrium specification,
it is easy to see that v0 is proper and vσ are perfect contracts for all σ ≥ 1. Also
due to the equilibrium specification one can easy to see that this web satisfies the
condition of contracts’ common stability by Definition 2.4.
Let us check the inverse inclusion. Let x¯ ∈ intX∩Dcp(E in). By definition there is
a weak stable web of contracts V =
s⋃
σ=1
V σ
⋃
W , realizing the allocation x¯ = x(V ),
so that all contracts from V σ are perfect, all contracts from W are proper, and the
web is stable relative to the simultaneous procedure of breaking (corresponding to
the type of contract) and signing new ones in the “present”.
Since we always have Dcp(E in) ⊂ Dsp(E in), then due to Lemma 2.1 and condition
x¯ ∈ intX ∩ Dcp(E in), one can conclude that the conditions of Lemma 2.2 and its
Corollary 2.2 are satisfied. Now let p¯ = (p¯0, . . . , p¯s) be a vector, which due to
Corollary 2.2 corresponds (uniquely) to the allocation x¯ and satisfies (2.11). We
have to show that there exists such z¯ that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯), where q¯ =
∑σ=s
σ=1 p¯σAσ, is the
GEI-equilibrium allocation of model E in. Having this in mind first let us state that
x¯ ∈ intX ∩ Dcp(E in) implies
〈p¯, x¯i〉 = 〈p¯, ωi〉, i ∈ I.
Assuming the contrary, suppose there is consumer i0 such that p¯ ωi0 > p¯ x¯i0 . Then
via the smoothness of preferences, we obtain
x¯i0 + µ(ωi0 − x¯i0) Âi0 x¯i0
for some real µ > 0 small enough. However now, using (2.3), one can write
x¯0i0 + µ(ω
0
i0
− x¯0i0) = ω0i0 +∆0i0(V )− µ∆0i0(V ) = ω0i0 + (1− µ)∆0i0(W ),
x¯σi0 + µ(ω
σ
i0
− x¯σi0) = ωσi0 +∆i0(V σ) + Aσ∆zi0 − µ∆i0(V σ)− µAσ∆zi0 =
= ωσi0 + (1− µ)∆i0(V σ) + (1− µ)Aσ∆zi0 , σ = 1, . . . , s.
Clearly by the choice of µ one can think 0 ≤ (1−µ) < 1, µ > 0, and the participant
i0 can partially break all contracts in a share µ, increasing utility, which contradicts
the lower stability of the proper contractual allocation x¯. Therefore 〈p¯, x¯i〉 ≤ 〈p¯, ωi〉
for all i ∈ I. Now via the feasibility of x¯, one obtains the result.
Further, from Lemma 2.1, Lemma 2.2 and its Corollary 2.2 we have x¯ ∈ H(p¯1),
that means
p¯σx¯
σ
i = p¯σω
σ
i + p¯σAσz¯i ∀σ ≥ 1
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for some z¯i ∈ Rk and all i ∈ I, and also
∑
i∈I z¯i = 0. Let us take this z¯ = (z¯i)i∈I as
a net trade portfolio for allocation x¯. From the above relations, using
p¯x¯i =
s∑
σ=0
p¯σx¯
σ
i = p¯0x¯
0
i +
s∑
σ=1
p¯σω
σ
i +
s∑
σ=1
p¯σAσz¯i =
s∑
σ=0
p¯σω
σ
i
one can easily conclude that p¯0x¯
0
i = p¯0ω
0
i − q¯z¯i takes place for q¯ =
∑σ=s
σ=1 p¯σAσ. Now
applying Corollary 2.2 and (2.11), one can conclude that for each i the vector x¯i is
the maximal element of Âi on the set Bi(p¯, q¯) of all xi ∈ Xi, satisfying the conditions
∃ zi ∈ Rk : p¯0x0i = p¯ω0i − q¯zi & p¯σxσi = p¯ωσi + p¯σAσzi ∀σ ≥ 1.
However, using (S), local nonsatiation in each of the spot markets, and following
along standard line of augmentation, one can state that if Âi attains a maximal
point9 on the set of all xi ∈ Xi such that
∃ zi ∈ Rk : p¯0x0i ≤ p¯ω0i − q¯zi & p¯σxσi ≤ p¯ωσi + p¯σAσzi ∀σ ≥ 1
is true (in fact equal to i’s budget set for incomplete market), then this point un-
doubtedly has to belong to the set Bi(p¯, q¯) (i.e., for this point all inequalities are
realized in the form of an equality). So we have proven condition (i) of Definition
2.1 for(x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯).
As the requirement (ii) of this definition is also obviously true, Theorem 2.1 is
proved.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. To apply Scarf’s theorem we need to show that the game
(I, Vp), determined via an incomplete market under fixed prices p1, is balanced.
With this in mind let us consider a balanced family of coalitions B. It needs to be
shown that for every utility-vector v, corresponding to some p1-feasible allocation,
the following
[∀S ∈ B pr|S(v) ∈ Vp(S)]⇒ vI ∈ Vp(I)
is true. In fact, due to the game definition, for each S ∈ B there is xS ∈ Ap(S) such
that vS = (vi)i∈S ≤ (ui(xSi ))i∈S = uS(xS). Using the balanced family definition, for
each S ∈ B one can find a real λS ≥ 0. Now, multiplying inequalities on λS and
summing then by S from B, due to the concavity of the utility functions we yield
(vi)i∈I ≤ (ui(x¯i))i∈I for some x¯ ∈ Ap(I), which proves vI ∈ Vp(I).
Finally, if v¯I is the vector realizing the maximum of
∑
i∈I vi subject to vI = (vi)I
from the core of (I, Vp) (which is compact), then obviously the allocation correspond-
ing to it is from Cp(E).
Proof of Lemma 2.3. To state the conclusion of lemma on the side of necessity,
let us consider some x ∈ C(E in) ∩ intX. Clearly, every allocation from the core of
E in is a relative equilibrium for the markets of future states of the world in reduced
economies E inσ relative to endowments ωσi +Aσ∆zi(W ), i ∈ I and subject to the fixed
9To be sure such point does exist, one may assume, in addition, strict monotonicity for at least
one agent’s preferences and every consumption set is bounded from below. This is so provided
that budget sets are compact, which due to the continuity of preferences, gives the result.
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consumption in all other markets (since every contract for future events is perfect,
then it follows from Theorem 1.2). This in particular proves (i). Next let us prove
(ii). Due to x ∈ intX and all utilities being differentiable, the vectors of equilibrium
prices p¯σ, σ ≥ 1 are uniquely determined (up to normalization), and it follows from
(M) that p¯σ À 0. Show that x ∈ Cp¯(E in). The proof parallels the proof of item (ii)
from Lemma 2.1. Presuming the contrary, find y ∈ Ap¯(S) such that y ÂS x relative
to p¯1. Since x ∈ Ap¯(I), y ∈ Ap¯(S), there are such z, z′ that the equalities
p¯σx
σ
i − p¯σωσi = p¯σAσzi, σ = 1, . . . , s, i ∈ I,
p¯σy
σ
i − p¯σωσi = p¯σAσz′i, σ = 1, . . . , s, i ∈ S
are fulfilled. As soon as all contracts for future states are assumed to be perfect, we
can substitute the initial web V σ, which realizes the allocation (xσi )i∈I by the web
consisting of two proper contracts v′σ and v′′σ:
v′i
σ
= yσi − ωσi − Aσz′i, i ∈ S, v′iσ = 0, i ∈ I \ S,
v′′i
σ
= (xσi − yσi )− Aσ(zi − z′i), i ∈ S, v′′i σ = xσi − ωσi − Aσzi, i ∈ I \ S.
The last one can be done for all σ = 1, . . . , s. At present one can save “old” contracts.
Due to consumption sets being rectangular and due to the Ap¯(S) specification, one
can easy see that all of them are contracts forming a web. Recall that to see if these
contracts are proper it is enough to check v′i
σp¯σ = 0 v
′′
i
σp¯σ = 0 for all i. In so doing,
by definition, the new web has to be stable relative to the simultaneous procedure of
breaking and signing a new contract in the “present.” However breaking all contracts
of a second kind now and all contracts in the present and signing for t = σ = 0 the
new contract w = [(y0i − ω0i , z′i)]i∈S, the members of coalition S are able to realize
the allocation y ∈ Ap¯(S), which contradicts the incomplete market core definition.
Further let us prove the sufficiency of items (i) and (ii) of Lemma 2.3. By
assumption, xσ is Pareto optimal in a σ-reduced model for a fixed x−σ relative to
endowments ωσi +Aσzi, σ ≥ 1. And moreover, x ∈ Cp(E in)∩ intX for partial Pareto
prices p1 = (p1, . . . , ps). Therefore there are zi ∈ Rk satisfying the condition
P1x
1
i = P1ω
1
i + P1Azi.
Now let us consider the web V = ∪
σ≥1
{vσ} ∪ {w}, where
w = (x0 − ω0, z), vσ = (xσ − ωσ − Aσz), σ = 1, . . . , s
for Aσz = (Aσzi)i∈I . We have to prove that the allocation x = x(V ), realized via
this web, belongs to the incomplete market core, i.e., x = x(V ) ∈ C(E in).
Next we show first that each contract vσ, σ ≥ 1 is perfect in fact. Really, for
fixed σ ≥ 1 due to a specification we have pσvσi = 0 for all i. Since the prices p1 are
partial Pareto, then for all i we also have
pσy
σ
i > pσx
σ
i ∀ yi = (yσi , x−σi ) ∈ Pi(xi).
Now one can apply Proposition 1.1, and using the sufficiency of (1.1) conclude that
contract vσ is coherent. But applying Theorem 1.2 for a Pareto optimal allocation
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x ∈ intX realized by coherent web (since (ii) implies (iv)) we can conclude that the
web is perfect. Therefore, contract vσ is perfect and this is true for all σ ≥ 1.
Let a coalition S ⊂ I, virtual proper webs V σ ∼ {vσ} and their subwebs Uσ ⊂
V σ, which are realized after this coalition breaks a part of its virtual contracts, be
given for all σ ≥ 1, and let supp(uσ)⊆S for every uσ ∈ Uσ and each σ ≥ 1, i.e., (2.4)
is true.
In the present let the members of S sign a new contract (u0, z0), breaking contract
w. In such a case, the members of S realize the following allocation y = (yi)i∈S:
y0i = ω
0
i + u
0
i , i ∈ S,
yσi = ω
σ
i +∆i(U
σ) + Aσz
0
i , σ ≥ 1, i ∈ S.
Now, since contracts from Uσ are proper and in view of Theorem 1.2, we get pσu
σ
i =
0, uσ ∈ Uσ, which implies
pσy
σ
i = pσω
σ
i + pσAσz
0
i , σ ≥ 1, i ∈ S.
From (2.4) we have
∑
S ∆i(U
σ) = 0 for all σ ≥ 1, and by contract specification∑
S u
0
i = 0 and
∑
S z
0
i = 0; this proves
∑
S yi =
∑
S ωi. So as a result we have
y ∈ Ap(S) and see that domination by coalition S is impossible.
So, it is proved that contracts vσ, σ = 1, . . . , s are perfect and the web is stable
by Definition 2.3. Thus x is a semi-perfect contractual allocation, as we wanted to
prove.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. The proof is based on the simple application of Corollary 2.4
of Lemma 2.3, however let us consider this in detailed form.
First of all let us remark that assumption Pi(ωi) ⊂ intXi ∀ i ∈ I, implies that
x ∈ intX as for x ∈ C(E) and also for x ∈ C(E in). This is why in below considerations
we can always think x ∈ intX.
Let us show the inclusion C(E)⊆C(E in). Let x ∈ C(E). Then for each σ the
allocation xσ is partially Pareto optimal, which implies the existence of price-vector
p¯1 À 010 such that condition (x˜σi , x−σi ) Âi (xσi , x−σi ) (relative to fixed x−σ) implies
p¯σx˜σi > p¯
σxσi for all i. Now let us represent x as a p¯
1-feasible allocation (to apply
Corollary 2.4). For this we need to find a feasible trade net of portfolios (zi)i∈I ,
satisfying the system of linear equations
P1x
1
i = P1ω
1
i + P1Azi. (2.36)
Since the market is complete, this system is solvable relative to zi. Therefore x ∈
Ap¯(I). Now let us presume that x /∈ C(E in). Then due to Corollary 2.4, we get
x /∈ Cp(E in) for each p1 À 0, and hence for given p¯1 À 0. Thus there is such
coalition S ⊂ I and p¯1-feasible for S allocation y that
yi Âi xi, ∀ i ∈ S.
10The property p¯1 À 0 follows from the strict monotonicity of utilities, which is guaranteed due
to assumption (M).
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However the last one contradicts x ∈ C(E), and this ends the check for inclusion.
It is easy to see that the web realizing the given complex contractual allocation
x ∈ C(E in) is the collection
V = {(u, z)}
s⋃
σ=1
{vσ},
where u = x0 − ω0 and z = (zi)i∈I are such that zi satisfy the system (2.36),11 and
vσi = x
σ
i − ωσi − Aσzi for every i ∈ I and σ = 1, . . . , s.
Let us prove the inverse inclusion C(E in)⊆C(E). Consider x ∈ C(E in). Due to
Corollary 2.4 there exists a price-vector p¯1 À 0 such that x ∈ Cp¯(E in). Note if
allocation y dominates via S allocation x (in an ordinary sense), i.e., if there are
such yi ∈ Xi that yi Âi xi for all i ∈ S and
∑
i∈S yi =
∑
i∈S ωi, then in view of
market completeness one can find such z˜i ∈ Rk, i ∈ S that system (2.36) has a
solution relative to z˜i and for fixed yi (substitute z˜i instead of zi and yi instead of
xi). Since these z˜i satisfy
∑
S z˜i = 0, then y ∈ Ap¯(S), and therefore x /∈ Cp¯(E in),
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. The proof of lemma is reduced to the application of the
separation theorem to a convex set properly constructed,; this set correspond to the
ability of fuzzy coalitions to dominate an allocation.
Analogously to formula (2.6), let us determine the subspaces
Hi = H + ωi, H = {y ∈ Rl(s+1) | ∃ z ∈ Rk : pσyσ = pσAσz, ∀σ ≥ 1}.
Next let us take any consumer i0 ∈ I, let i0 = 1, and determine the following set
G = G(x) = co
[
(P1(x1)− ω1)
⋃( n∪
i=2
[(Pi(xi)− ωi) ∩H]
)]
.
Now show that if 0 ∈ G, then there is a fuzzy coalition p-dominating given allocation
x in an incomplete market. In fact, 0 ∈ G implies the existence of t = (t1, . . . , tn) ≥
0,
∑
ti = 1 such that for some yi ∈ Pi(xi)∑
i∈I
ti(yi − ωi) = 0 ⇐⇒
∑
i∈I
tiyi =
∑
i∈I
tiωi (2.37)
is true and moreover for i = 2, . . . , n
∃ zi ∈ Rk : P1yi = P1ωi + P1Azi
takes place. To check the fuzzy domination definition in part (2.15), it is sufficient
to state the last relation for i = 1 ∈ supp(t). To realize this, multiply (2.37) on
matrix P1, which after transformations due to t1 6= 0 yields
P1yi = P1ωi + P1A(−
∑n
i=2
ti
t1
zi).
11More exactly, it is the system defined via the square non-degenerated submatrix of P1A, whose
dimension is equal to s.
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Thus one can take z1 = −
∑n
i=2
ti
t1
zi as the necessary solution (portfolio) for agent
1. As a result we conclude that coalition t can p-dominate the allocation.
Therefore, for every fuzzy incomplete market core element x, it has to be that
0 /∈ G and since int G 6= ∅ (because of intX1 6= ∅ due to (A) and intP1(x1) 6= ∅),
then one can apply the separation theorem and find such non-zero p¯ that
〈p¯, G〉 ≥ 0.
Since P1(x1) − ω1 and (Pi(xi) − ωi) ∩ H, i = 2, . . . , n are the subsets of G, we
conclude
〈p¯,P1(x1)〉 ≥ p¯ω1 & 〈p¯,Pi(xi) ∩ (ωi +H)〉 ≥ p¯ωi, ∀ i = 2, . . . , n.
Moreover the first of these inequalities due to (S), x1 ∈ intX1 and p¯ 6= 0 implies
p¯σ 6= 0, ∀σ in a standard way (presuming the contrary, one can conclude p¯ = 0,
that is impossible). Lemma is proved.
Conclusion
One of the results of this investigation is an development of (exchange) contracts
theory, the elements of which were founded in Makarov (1980), (1982) and Kozyrev
(1981), (1982). Applying this theory, first developed in an abstract way and then
for classical markets, the analysis of incomplete market theory was realized. The
main goal of this analysis and this project as a whole is to study the ability to
correctly introduce domination via coalitions and subsequently a core concept for
incomplete markets. This concept was introduced in this paper, and it is based on
our contractual approach. In so doing, it was proved that a suggested incomplete
market core satisfies the following (two) requirements:
• If an economy is described as an incomplete market but is mathematically
equivalent to a classical pure exchange model (i.e., it is a complete economy
in fact), then the core in the context of an incomplete market has to coincide
with the classical core of a pure exchange economy.
• In conditions of perfect competition, the core of an incomplete market coincides
with the set of equilibrium allocations.
Namely due to these two properties, one can state that the correct concept of core
is truely introduced. Then it seems to be true that this concept is a natural gen-
eralization of the classical approach save its the most meaningful properties. It is
important that the suggested concept being based on the notion of a contract does
not address to current allocation value characterizations — attention is concentrated
on exchange contracts, their sets and the different kinds of stability properties. Some
kind of value characterizations (p-core, fuzzy p-domination) have appeared in the
analysis of core allocations, but it is more a technical element of investigation than
an element of its foundation. The mathematical generality of the proved theorems
seems to be reasonable in the incomplete market context. This is why the inves-
tigator of the project think that the main goal of the project has been attained.
Further, let us consider the detailed results and conclusions that have been achieved
in this investigation.
Main results
Let us start from a conceptual description of the main notions of elaborated contracts
theory.
• The theory of contracts. A contract is an elementary exchange of commodities
among the members of a group (coalition) of economic agents. Not every exchange
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presents a permissible contract; there are a lot of reasons for this (physical, institu-
tional, behavioral etc.). Contracts my be added to each other and with the initial
endowments. This way, to any (finite) set of contracts an allocation of commodities
among agents may be put into correspondence. Each consumer or their coalition can
break contracts in which they participate, and a coalition can also sign a new one. A
finite collection of contracts forms a web, if after breaking any subset of contracts,
a feasible allocation is realized. From the set of all webs one extracts stable webs.
They are webs such that no agents are stimulated to change them; no coalition can
break a part of these contracts and sign a new one and still have an advantage for
all of its members. The kind of web stability can be differentiated and, in addition,
extracted: lower stable (stability relative only to breaking given contracts), upper
stable (nobody wants to sign a new contract without breaking given ones) and weak
stable (both properties together but in separately applied). Sometimes contracts
can be divided (partitioned) into (proportional) parts, and some of these obtained
contracts can be broken (partial breaking). Admission of ability to partially break
contracts raises the stability of final resource allocation and of its realized web. The
webs which are lower stable relative to the partial breaking of contracts (from the
web) are called proper. An allocation is called proper if a web can be realized such
that any another web produced from the given one as its partition is stable (the
agents have no incentives to partially break contracts and simultaneously sign a
new one). The proper webs are considered to be long-living ones. For the class of
proper webs an equivalence relation is introduced. This equivalence identifies the
webs that realize the same deviations of consumption programs for each agent. A
web, which is equivalent to some given one, is called a virtual web. This equivalence
relation is applied to introduce another important notion, the perfect contract. A
contract is called perfect if being substituted by any virtual web, nobody can get an
advantage from breaking contracts from this web. Namely, perfect contracts play
the key role in the introducing the core concept in an incomplete market. A web
containing only perfect contracts is called perfect. A structure of permissible con-
tracts for an economy may allow the ability to classify contracts via its characteristic
feature (type). In such a case one can require contracts of different types to satisfy
different kinds of stability. An allocation that can be realized by a stable web (in
one sense) where there is correspondence between the type of contract and the kind
of its stability is called complex contractual .
• Perfect market. For a classical pure exchange economy the following results
were obtained. A contract-based economy is put into correspondence to the model,
and it is postulated that all contracts are permissible for this contractual economy.
In such a case, some well known notions of economic theory obtain treatments in pure
contractual terms. For example, the Pareto optimality is equivalent to the ability
to realize an allocation via an upper stable web. An allocation belongs to the core if
and only if it can be realized by some stable web of contracts. If a point is interior
and the model is smooth, then the allocation is equilibrium one if and only if it may
be realized by a web of contracts that is stable under conditions allowing contracts
to be partially broken; thus the web is perfect or proper (weaker requirements are
also possible). In the classical model, the conditions of perfect competition, which
mean that the ability of the core allocation to be price decentralized, are (by the
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fact) equivalent to the stability of the web realizing this allocation under conditions
allowing contracts to be partially broken.
• Incomplete market. The application of contracts theory to incomplete mar-
kets yields the following main results. A contract-based model, which is put into
correspondence to an incomplete market, is such that only contracts realizing the
exchange of commodities for some fixed event are permissible ones, where exchanges
via real assets are allowed in the present , where the trade of the given initial model
collection of fixed standard contracts is realized. Applying only these standard con-
tracts, one can realize the commodity exchange between different states of nature.
In so doing, one can also realize an exchange of commodities in the present for the
consumption at future events. Let the model be smooth and a point (allocation) be
taken from the interior of the consumption sets in all subsequent considerations.
For the allocations of an incomplete market core, it is suggested to take complex
contractual allocations, which can be realized via a web of permissible contracts
that is stable in the following sense. The web as a whole is weak stable and all
contracts corresponding to future events are perfect. The web also has to satisfy the
additional stability property: there is no coalition for which it is profitable to break
all contracts with non-members of the coalition; therewith, for future events they
can break contracts from virtual webs, but present contracts may be broken only as a
whole, and moreover the coalition can sign a new contract in the present. It has been
proved that if the structure of assets in an (incomplete) market is complete, then the
incomplete market core coincides with the classical one. Here an assets structure is
complete if all commodities are desirable (goods) and for all positive prices in future
events markets the matrix of financial returns, defined via real assets matrix, has
a rank equal to the number of future events. Simply speaking, the latter means
that there are enough independent assets — enough to realize any value transfer
from one given future event to any other one without loss of value at other non-true
events. This means that the considered core concept satisfies the first suggested
criteria. It has also been proven that the concept satisfies the second criteria —
under perfect competition conditions, the core and equilibria coincides. Moreover
this fact is presented in two versions.
The first theorem states the description of GEI-equilibria in pure contractual
terms, where a stability relative to the partial breaking of contracts is allowed. More
detailed, an incomplete market equilibrium can be describe as a complex contractual
allocation of the following kind. There exists a weak stable web of permissible
contracts such that contracts for future events are perfect and as a whole the web is
stable relative to the partial breaking of contracts in the present and to the breaking
of virtual contracts for future events, and relative to a new contract in the present
that can be signed. In other words for every event, a subweb relative to this event
has to be stable therewith for future events in the strong sense (since then contracts
are perfect), and the web as a whole has to satisfy the condition of joint stability
described above.
The second theorem follows to the classical modelling tradition of perfect compe-
tition conditions — being replicated, an allocation can be considered as an allocation
of a replicated economy and it has to belong to the core of the replicated model.
Then such an allocation may be decentralized.
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The facts presented above allow me to assert that the introduced core concept
is correct.
The investigation also contains the analysis of Hart’s example well known in in-
complete market theory. Under specific model parameters there is no equilibrium
in this example. It was clarified, that the core in the described sense may also not
exist . The cause of this is the specific financial market properties. Namely, if the
number of assets is limited, the situation may occur when market operators tend to
raise contract volumes for assets with no limit. It seems to be true that this is a
degenerated case, which may happened only under a specific relationship between
preferences and assets (it is well known in the theory that financial equilibria, which
always are in a core, generically do exist). Of course there are more chances for core
non-emptiness relative to equilibria. Moreover, the example shows that an incom-
plete market core may be nonclosed set. In particular, this is why one cannot apply
the classical scheme of the equilibrium existence proof, in which (quasi)equilibria
allocations are the elements of a symmetric part of core allocations of the replicated
model — the intersection of non-empty, bounded, embedded, but nonclosed sets
may be empty. In my opinion for the incomplete market core to be non-empty, it
is necessary that grand coalition abilities be supplemented by marginal variants of
consumption bundles, i.e., one needs in fact to pass to the closure of an appropriate
set. The problem of core emptiness can be solved if one imposes some institutional
constraints on trade volumes for a financial market. It is known that when some
constrains of this kind take place, then equilibria exist under rather weak model
assumptions. Moreover, relaxing constraints to infinity, one can also consider limit
equilibrium allocations (e.g., see Marakulin (1999), Florenzano et al. (1998)). These
arguments may be applied to the core concept also, and in such a case one can pass
to the consideration of approximating and marginal dominating variants and the in-
complete market core with a non-empty core seems possible to introduce. However,
these ideas were not elaborated in this investigation.
Resumed conclusions and policy making
In their application, the obtained theoretical results of the investigation can be
realized in the following conclusions.
(i) The potential instability of the financial assets market is its characteristic fea-
ture. This instability can become apparent as an inability to equate supply and
demand (no equilibrium) and also as a form of instability with respect to coalition
domination. Formally this instability can be realized via market operators tending
to raise the volumes of contracts with no limit.
(ii) To stabilize the financial market, the policy of institutional constraints for trade
volumes in the financial market seems to be reasonable. These constraints have to be
provisional and have to be relaxed to infinity if it is possible. When it is impossible
some new assets have to be created and introduced into the financial market in order
to stabilize it.
(iii) In accordance with item (ii), the elements of financial market regulation can
be mainly recommended to fast developing national financial markets , during a
transition time period when the number of new assets and services are quickly
increasing (they penetrate from abroad and are born in the internal market itself).
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It seems to be true that this conclusion may be applied to the case of Russian
economy.
Possible subsequent investigations
One possible way to develop the obtained theoretical results of this investigation
is to further strengthen them from the formal-mathematical point of view; in partic-
ular, the study of the ability to extend results for the non-smooth case is possible. It
seems that in a lot of cases, it is possible to do this. However, it may require one to
not only continue the study of perfect contracts and webs but also probably a minor
modification of this concept. This modification, of course, does not have to change
the essence of this for the smooth case. As a whole this is not easy mathematical
work, but this requires time and a methodical approach.
I think that the contract-based approach can be applied to suggest a microeco-
nomic foundation of the taˆtonnement process, which is the process of price changing.
The grounds of this broadly discussed process which is still not proved. An idea is
that with every exchange bargain for a coalition, one can associate some prices (pos-
sibly not unique). The fact that among these coalition prices there are no equilibrium
prices means that a coalition exists that can strike a bargain which is profitable for
all its members. In so doing, it is important that in contrast with classical case (as
e.g., Smale (1981)), we allow not only a new contract to be signed but also given
contracts can be broken. In particular, one can interpret the deviation of current
non-equilibrium resource allocation via contractual approach and avoid the standard
conjecture that an auctioneer does exist (he/she defines the trade process and the
process of price changing to achieve the final allocation). A coalition can realize the
same thing via its members and defines itself exchange proportions in the bargain
that is realized.
The contract-based approach can be also extended to other more general models
in comparison with the studied ones. Among these models there may be sequential
markets and markets with transaction costs (for transactions for bargains, see Repul-
lo (1988)), models for which trust among agents is important (e.g., see Gale (1978)),
etc. Namely this ability of expansion approach seems the most interesting for the
author of this project. For example, it seems very perspective to study economies
with information asymmetry of economic agents, the ability indicated by the expert
group (I gratefully acknowledge them for this). There is a wide range of literature
on this subject, partially presented in our lists of references. In the most complete
form, this direction is described in Schwable’s monograph (1999). It seems that the
contractual approach can be fruitfully applied to the models of this kind. The key
point to realize is the correct definition of the set of all permissible contracts, which
essentially has to be based on economic agents’ information abilities. A generally
accepted method to model individual information about the future events of the
world is that some sigma-algebra of events is added to the description of an agent;
this algebra distinguishes the events which an agent can identify (differentiate). The
case becomes rather clear if there is no informational exchange among the members
of the dominating coalition. For this case, to define a permissible contract notion,
one can postulate the measurability of the consumption bundles vector (mapping),
determining the deviation of an agent’s current consumption in a contract, i.e., a
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contract as a whole has to be measurable relative to an appropriate product of
sigma-algebras. In this context, one can also consider the finest (weakest) algebra
of events, which is coarser (finer) for each agent algebra from a coalition going to
sign a contract. In so doing the members of a coalition “emulate” the less (most)
informed agents. The admission of informational exchange leads to the enlargement
of a model with the rule of information sharing. This case is rather non-trivial, and
I am not ready to answer what is the most correct way to model the case via the
contract-based approach (also there is no unified opinion in the literature on how
one has to postulate the core concept or simply to model this situation). However
we think that this also has to be described via the requirement of contract permis-
sibility, expressed in terms of information abilities of a coalition; once again it has
to be the measurability relative to some sigma-algebra.
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